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- 1  -Preface 
This  study  is a  complement  to  a  previous  study  on  a  parallel  subject: 
"US-EC  Monetary  Relations".  Since  the  former  study  was  published,  some 
progress  has  been  achieved  in  economic  cooperation,  in  particular after 
the  Venice  Summit,  although  cooperation  remains  of  an  ad  hoc  nature. 
Much  has  still to  be  done  in  this field,  as  is  illustrated in this study. 
It  is  hoped  that  the  present  study  may  make  a  useful  contribution. 
The  study  examines  as  far  as  possible all aspects  of  EC-Japanese  economic 
relations,  monetary,  trade,  capital  movements,  investment  and  economic 
policy  issues,  and  the  advantages  of  increased  cooperation  for  all 
parties  concerned.  It also examines  the  problems  and  frictions  that 
exist. 
Opinions  and  recommendations  contained  in  this  paper  are  those  of  the 
authors  and  are  not  necessarily  those  of  this  Directorate General,  or  the 
European  Parliament,  or  any  of  its organs  or  Members. 
This  study  has  been  requested  by  the  Chairman  of  the  German  Members  of 
the  Socialist  Group  of  the  European  Parliament,  Mr  Gerd  Walter. 
Nicholas  Kyriazis  is  an  official  of  this  Directorate General. 
Stefan  Kalb  contributed to  this  study  during  his  period at  the  European 
Parliament  as  a  Robert  Schuman  Scholar. 
Francis  ROY 
Director  General  a.p. 
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64 Introduction 
The  importance  of  Japan  to  the  world  economy  is well  known.  Japanese 
exports  accounted  for  17%  of  total  US  imports,  19%  of  imports  of  other 
developed  nations  and  20%  of  the  imports  of  the  developing  nations.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  is  no  denying  that  the  yen  is still underutilized 
in  the  international  arena.  A case  in  point  is yen-denominated  trade 
financing.  Only  34%  of  Japan's  exports  and  around  10%  of  its imports  are 
financed  in  yen,  and  this is partly due  to the  yen's  recent  appreciation. 
In  general,  the  international  position of  the  yen  as  a  settlement 
currency  is still extremely  low. 
The  same  more  or  Less  applies  also  to  the  yen's  position as  a  reserve 
currency.  In  1985,  only  7,6%  of  global  foreign  reserves  were  held  in  yen, 
considerably  less  than  those  in  DM,  which  accounted  for  15,5%.  According 
to  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements  (B!S),  among  external 
liabilities, those  denominated  in  yen  accounted  for  only  2,3%  of  the 
total  in  September  1985,  far  below  the  72,4%  and  11%  recorded  for  dollar-
and  DM  denominated  debts. 
It  is true  that  the  Japanese  yen  has  become  progressively more 
internationalised  in  the  1980s.  For  example  the  BIS  reports  that  banking 
sector  lending  in  yen  as  a  percentage  of  total  lending  flows  rose  from 
minimal  7,4%  in  1983  to  12,6%  in  1986.  The  corresponding  figure  for  the 
dollar  saw  a  reduction  from  79,6%  to  70,2%.  Furthermore,  among  issues  of 
international  bonds  with  fixed  interest  rates,  yen  issues  now  (June  1987) 
account  for  14,9%  of  the  total  as  against  43,8%  for  the  dollar.  In 
international.  and  external  bond  markets,  the  shares  held  by  new  financial 
instruments  such  as  floating  rate  notes  (FRN)  and  note  issuance 
facilities  (NIF)  are  growing  fast,  reflecting the  progress of  financial 
innovations  in  the  international  capital  market.  In  1986,  for  example, 
FRN's  accounted  for  22,9%  of  total  international  and  external  bond 
issues.  But,  more  than  90%  of all  FRN's  are dollar  denominated.  As  a 
result,  yen-denominated  bond  issues  account  for  only  about  8%  of  total 
international  and  external  issues. 
- 4  -The  gap  between  Japan's  economic  power  and  the  role  of  the  yen  in  the 
world  economic  system  is  in  part  attributable to  the  slowness  of  its 
financial  Liberalisation,  as  against  the  rapid  implementation  of  trade 
liberalisation  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.  It  is also partly due  to  the 
concern  of  the  Central  Bank  of  Japan  (as  of  other central  banks)  about 
the  eroding effectiveness of  monetary  controls. 
During  recent  years,  contacts  between  the  Community  and  Japan  have 
intensified and  are  expected  to  continue  so  in  the  future.  These  contacts 
were  concentrated  in  the  ~rea of  trade  relations.  Since  1973  bi-annual 
EC-Japan  meetings  concerning  economic  and  industrial  questions  have  been 
taking  place.  (1) 
Japan  was  the  Community's  second  biggest  supplier  in  1986,  accounting  for 
10%  of  its imports  and  its fifth  largest  export  market,  taking  3%  of  its 
total  exports.  Trade  between  the  two  sides  comprises  mainly  industrial 
products,  although  the  Community  exports  large quantities  of  meat  and 
alcoholic  beverages  to  Japan.  The  EC  exports  mainly  organic  chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals,  textiles,  manufactured  mineral  products,  non-ferrous 
metals,  machinery,  road  vehicles  and  clothing.  Japan  exports  mainly 
office machinery,  electronic  consumer  goods  and  telecommunications 
equipment,  electrical goods,  road  vehicles  and  photographic  equipment  but 
it also  exports  significant quantities  of  chemicals,  manufactured  rubber 
products,  paper,  textiles, manufactured  mineral  goods,  steel products, 
machinery  and  precision  instruments. 
Over  the  last  15  years,  trade  between  the  EC  and  Japan  has  increased 
spectacularly,  but  largely  in  Japan's  favour.  The  Community's  trade 
deficit  with  Japan  rose  from  US$  500  mn  in  1970  to  US$  7  bn  in  1978  and 
US$  21,5  bn  in  1986  for  the  EC-12.  Characteristically,  the  value  of  the 
goods  imported  in  1986  compared  with  1985  increased  by  117%  in  the  case 
of  compact  discs,  41%  in  that  of  cars  and  27%  in  that  of  machining 
centres.  This  increase  is due  to a  marked  rise  in  Japan's  exports  to the 
EC,  while  Japan's  exports  to  the  US  increased  to a  much  Lesser  degree 
during  the  same  period  (by  23,2%  for  the  US  as  against  47,5%  for  the  EC). 
(2) 
- 5  -Seen  as  a  whole,  economic  relations  between  Japan  and  the  EC  can  be 
characterised as  underdeveloped,  since  there  has  been  up  until  recently  a 
lack  of  serious  cooperation  in  the  fields  of  economic  policy  in  general 
and  of  monetary  matters  in  particular.  The  main  issue  was  trade,  which 
was  discussed  in  isolation and  not  in  relation  to  questions  such  as 
economic  (fiscal  and  monetary)  policies  and  related aspects  <such  as  for 
example  different  capital  and  labour  market  situations).  The  EC  Member 
States  negotiated as  a  rule  individually with  Japan  on  a  bilateral basis. 
This  led  sometimes  to different  approaches  adopted  by  individual  Member 
States  towards  Japan  and  gave  rise to the  possibility of  conflicts,  a 
situation that  has  sometimes  been  exploited  by  Japan  (K.R.  Korte  1984). 
There  were  two  main  reasons  for  this  lack  of  a  tighter  EC-Japan 
cooperation  in  economic  affairs:  The  lack  of  the  will  for  a  coordinated 
EC  policy  towards  Japan  (the  same  lack  of  will  characterises  also  EC-US 
relations  in  the  monetary  fiPld)  due  to different  situations of  Er  Member 
States  in  regard  to  Japan  <conc~rning competition of  Japanese  imports  on 
their domestic  markets  and  related  employment  problems)  and  the  lack  of 
an  authorized  institutionalised body  that  would  represent  the  EC  as  a 
whole.  The  Commission  has  assumed  this  task  concerning  trade  relations 
with  Japan,  but  it  has  not  been  empowered  to  do  the  same  concerning 
economic  and  monetary  policy  (H.  Maull  1984). 
Monetary  relations  have  also  been  relatively weak  in  the  past.  Both  the 
EC  and  Japan  concentrated their attention on  the  exchange  rate  of  their 
respective  currencies  in  respect  of  the dollar.  Japanese-EC  monetary 
relations  were,  if they existed at all, a  residual  of  EC-US  and  Japan-US 
monetary  relations.  In  the  G-5  meeting  of  September  1985  for  example, 
negotiations  concerned  only the  dollar's exchange  rates. 
The  yen's  exchange  rates  increased  sharply  towards  the  dollar after 1985, 
while  they  fluctuated  Less  with  the  ECU~ 
- 6  -Table  1 
Exchange  rates of the yen 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  Feb  19871 
IECU  315  245  243  211  187  180  160  173  I 
I Dollar I  226  220  248  237  237  238  168  153  I 
Source:  Eurostat  General  Statistics, B Series,  3,  1987 
Table  2 
Index  of effective exchange  rates,  1980 = 100 
1980  1983  1984  1985  1986(1)  1986(1V) 
I  Japan  100  117  124  127  148  165 
jUSA  100  133  144  150  129  118 
IBRD  100  99  96  96  103  110 
I  France  100  74  70  70  76  75 
Source:  Eurostat,  Economy  and  Finance,  Serie B,  Shurt  term  trends, 
3/4-1986 
After  the  G-5  meeting  in  September  1985,  the  yen  did  not  show  any  trend 
reversal  towards  the  ECU,  while  the  dollar  was  devalued  strongly against 
the  ECU  but  even  more  so  against  the  yen. 
During  recent  years,  interdependence  of  the  US,  the  EC  and  Japan  has 
increased.  Thus,  relations  between  the  EC  and  Japan  must  also  be  seen  in 
the  framework  of  EC-US  and  Japan-US  relations.  Due  to  domestic 
unemployment  problems,  the  current  account  deficits  have  increasingly 
become  political  issues  and  no  longer  only  economic  ones.  The  US  blamed 
the  huge  American  deficit  not  (or  not  in  the  main)  on  its domestic 
economic  policies  (for example  the  high  budget  deficit)  but  on  the 
undervalued  exchange  rates  of  some  of  their principal  trading partners, 
first  among  them  Japan.  A solution  of  the  US  current  account  deficits  was 
thus  seen  to  pass  through  a  devaluation of  the  US  dollar  and  a  parallel 
uppreciation of  the  yen  and  the  DM.  Higher  yen  exchange  rates  would 
eliminate  in  part  the  US  deficit  and  reduce  Japan's  surplus,  thus 
bringing  about  a  better equilibrium  in  international  trade  and  capital 
flows. 
- (  -Figure  1 
Index  of  exchange  rates  in  ECU 
1980:.:100 
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I Chapter 1.  Causes  of the yen's appreciation 
1.1  Japan's balance of payments 
One  of  the  main  causes  of  the  yen's  appreciation against  the  dollar after 
1985  and  against  the  ECU  almost  continuously  since  1980  is  the  persistent 
Japanese  trade  surplus. 
Table  3 
Current  amount  balance of  Japan 
in 11io  US$ 
I  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
I 
116  534  -8 754  l-10  746  4  770  6  850  20  799  35  003  49  169 
Source:  IMF  Financial  Statistics,  January  1987 
1978  I  1979  I  1980  I 
Table  4 
Trade  balance 
1981  I  1982  I 
in 11io  US$ 
1983  I  1984  I  1985  I 
1986 
85  966 
1986  I 
!Imports!  79  3431110  6721140  5281143  2901131  9311126  3931136  5031129  5311126  4081 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
!Exports!  97  5431103  0321129  8071152  0301138  831!146  9271170  1141175  6381209  1511 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
!Balance!  18  2001  -7 6401-10  7211  8  7401  6  9001  20  5341  33  6111  46  0991  82  7431 
Source:  Japan  Tariff  Association:  The  Summary  Reports,  Trade  of  Japan 
- 9  -During  recent  years  the  view  that  the  yen  has  been  undervalued  prevd·\Led~ 
as  became  clear  in  the  American  position  on  G-5  of  1985.  This  view 
maintains  that  since  Japan  shows  continuous  (and  often  increasing)  trade 
surpluses,  it must  follow  that  the  yen  is p(:rsistently  Lndt-rv- 'ucJ.  A 
"more  correct",  i.e.  higher,  exchange  rate of  the  yen  would  L'-~inish 
trade  surpluses  and  bring  about  a  more  equilibrated trade  JdLanc~. 
Underlying  this  view  is the "classical"  assumption  that  trade  balances 
respond  fairly  rapidly  and  certainly  in  the  expected  direc·~i•'n  to  r:i,;:- :;.:~s 
of  the  exchange  rate  (i.e.  appreciation  leads  to  diminishing  surpluses  of 
the  trade  balance  and  vice  versa).  This  assumes  of  course  further  that 
imports  and  exports  react  fairly elastically to  changes  ~f  relative 
prices  induced  by  changes  in  the  exchange  rate. 
The  situation is actually more  complex.  Trade  balances  do  not  react  fast 
and  not  always  in  the  presumed  direction to  changes  in  the  exchange  rate, 
and  imports  and  exports  are  not  always  very elastic  to  chanq~~  :n 
relative prices.  Furthermore,  structural effects  Like  growth  rates, 
productivity,  the  behaviour  of  the  labour  force  or of  enterprises,  (i.e. 
elements  that  influence  competitiveness)  are  on  the  whole  and  in  the 
long-run  more  important  for  the  development  of  the  trade  balance  and  the 
current  account  than  just  exchange  rates. 
The  following  points  emerge  from  the  observation of  recent  developments: 
1.  The  broad  swings  in  the  exchange  rate  are  consistent  with  general 
economic  theories  of  the  relationship between  domestic  and  global 
economic  developments  and  exchange  rate  movements.  For  example, 
periods  of  higher  inflation  tend  to  correspond  to episodes  of  yen 
weakness. 
2.  The  steep  appreciation  of  the  yen  that  occured after  1985  has 
parallels  in  historical experience,  as  for  example  the  period  1977 
Quarter  III  to  1978  Quarter  IV  when  the  yen  appreciated  against  the 
dollar  by  30%.  Such  sharp  exchange  movements  over  relatively short 
periods  do  impose  considerable  burdens  of  adjustment  on  Japanese 
industry. 
- 10  -3.  Movements  in  interest  rate differentials  began  to  correlate  n1ore 
closely with  exchange  rate  swings  starting  in  the  '80s  after 
significant  financial  liberalisation had  occured  in  JapanR  This 
correlation  is expected  to  continue  after the  newest  and  contimdng 
liberalisation measures  of  Japan.  Thereafter,  short-run movements  i~ 
the  yen's  foreign  exchange  value  are  probably  best  viewed  from  t:i2 
standpoint  of  asset  market  models  of  exchange  rate determination.(3) 
4.  During  Longer  periods  there  appears  to  have  been  a  positive 
correlation between  Japanese  current  account  surpluses  and  yen 
appreciation.(4)  Japan  has  run  current  account  surpluses  almost 
continuously  since  1965,  except  during  the  years  immediately  following 
the  two  oil  shocks  of  1973  and  1979.  Periods  of  strong  yen 
appreciation  have  tended  to  correlate  closely with  periods  of  growing 
current  account  surplus,  although  the  appreciation  eventual.Ly  (after a 
Lag  of  time)  induces  a  reduction  in  the  surplus,  as  shifts  ir- ' .• nand 
occur  in  response  to  the  associated  relative  price  changes.  This  has 
in  fact  just  happened,  beginning  in  the  second  half  of  1987.  This  is 
an  important  consideration  when  examining  policy options,  because  it 
must  not  be  expected  that  appreciation of  the  yen  would  immediately 
reduce  Japan's  trade  surpluses. 
A.  The  structure of  Japan's  trade 
Japanese  surpluses  are  mainty  due  to  high  export  growth  rates,  while 
imports  have  more  or  less  stagnated.  The  composition  of  exports  and 
imports  is different.  Due  to  Japan's  Lack  of  raw  materials,  a  lot  of 
internal  demand  for  these  is  covered  by  imports,  among  which  energy 
imDorts  are  particularly important.  The  share of  energy  imports  in 
Japan's  total  imports  was  42%  in  1985,  and  that  of  raw  materials  14%, 
compared  to the  EC's  20%  and  7%. 
Fluctuations  of  oil prices  have  thus  had  a  great  impact,  due  also  to  the 
fact  that  demand  for  oil  is fairly  inelastic  in  the  shortrun.  The  share 
of  oil  imports  in total  imports  was  44,3%  in  1975,  49,8%  in  1980,  43,1% 
in  1985  and  30,7%  in  1986.(5)  Falling oil prices  reduced  the  overall 
- 11  -value  of oil  imports  and  thus  influenced  negatively the  expected  rise of 
overall  imports  due  to the  yen's appreciation.  Since  the  price elasticity 
of  oil  imports  is small,  falling oil prices did  not  lead  to  increases  in 
oil  imports.  A similar situation applies  also more  or  Less  to other  raw 
material  imports. 
In  parallel  to the  import  side,  the  export  side of  Japan's  trade  account 
shows  a  strong  concentration  on  some  goods.  The  share  of  machines, 
television sets and  other electronic  goods  and  cars  reached  74%  of  total 
exports  by  1986,  being  50%  in  1968,  55%  in  1973  and  67%  in  1983.  The 
share  of  car exports  in particular  increased  from  10%  in  1973  to  25%  in 
1986.  Demand  for  some  of  these  products  is elastic  (cars,  electronic 
consumption  goods)  and  is thus  influenced  by  the yen's  exchange  rate.  On 
the  other  hand  demand  is fairly  inelastic  for  a  range  of  other  products 
(microelectronics  for  industrial  goods)  where  Japan  enjoys  an  almost 
monopolistic  position on  world  markets. 
B.  Japan's  production  structure 
Next,  the  structural  factors  that  influence  the yen's  exchange  rate  are 
examined: 
1.  Productivity growth:  Productivity is one  of  the  primary  factors 
influencing  competitiveness  and,  through  competitiveness,  trade. 
Japanese  productivity growth  has  outpaced  that  of  its major  trading 
partners.  It  was  particularly fast  up  until  the  '60s  and  has  slowed 
considerably  since  then.  Thus,  in this  respect,  Japan's  experience  was 
similar to that  of  most  European  countries.  The  remarkably  rapid 
growth  in  Japanese  productivity  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  and  the 
following  slowdown  can  be  explained  by  the  catch-up  hypothesis.  The 
fast  growth  phase  reflected the  fast  pace  of  technological  innovation 
deriving  from  a  backlog  of exploitable  foreign  (mainly  US) 
technologies.  The  slowdown  phase  reflects  in part  the elimination of 
ready  opportunities  to adopt  foreign  technologies  and  in part 
structural  changes  in  the  composition of  investment  (Marston  1986, 
Johnson  and  Loopesko,  1986). 
- 12  -As  Japan  became  a  more  mature  industrial  economy  in  the  1970s,  a 
greater  share of  investment  was  geared  towards  the  service sector, 
social  welfare,  anti-pollution  and  other activities,  where 
productivity was  Lower.  However,  Japan's  social  structure still  Lags 
behind  that  of  comparable  European  states. 
Still, Japan  has  maintained  faster  productivity growth  in 
manufacturing  than  her  major  trading  partners. 
Table  5 
Productivity growth  rates:  1975  - 1984 
Japan I  USA  I  Germany I  France I  UK  ICanadaiNether-1 
I  I  I  I  I  !Lands 
I  Total  manufacturing!  6,o  I  2,2  I  2,4  I  2,4  I 3,51  1,5  I 
!Electrical  machinery!  13,2  I 4,5  I  3,5  I  3,5  I 3,91  4,9  I 
Source:  OECD  Economic  Survey  of  Japan  1985 
Table  6 
Changes  in  Productivity Growth 
in Manufacturing  relative to  11  trading partners 
(relative annual  percentage  changes  in output  per  hour) 
!Period  Japan  USA  Germany 
11960- 73  5,9  -3,9  -0,3 
11973- 84  3,0  -1,7  -o,s 
5,5 
7,9 
Source:  Edwin  Dean,  Harry  Boisevain,  James  Thomas  "Productivity and 
Labor  Cost  Trends  in  Manufacturing,  12  Countries"  Monthly 
Labour  Review,  March  1986 
I 
I 
I 
Japan  has  had  the  fastest  productivity growth  in  both  the  fixed  (prior 
to  1972)  and  floating  exchange  rate  periods  among  the  12 
industrialised countries  considered  in  a  study  of  the  Bureau  of  Labour 
Statistics  (Dean  et al.  1986). 
- 13  -2.  Regional  pattern and  composition  of  trade:  An  important  impetus  to 
Japan's  productivity gains  in manufacturing  has  been  the  need  to 
develop  a  surplus  in  manufacturing  trade to offset  a  persistent 
deficit on  energy  and  raw  materials.  Japan  is dependent  on  imported 
raw  materials,  being  poor  in natural  resources,  with  the  result that 
it has  typically  run  trade deficits vis-a-vis  countries  classified as 
developed  primary  producers  (like  Australia,  New  Zealand,  South  Africa 
and  Canada  and  vis-a-vis oil exporting nations  like  Saudi-Arabia,  Iran 
and  Indonesia).  Japan's  longer-run  tendency  towards  trade  surplus  with 
the  EC  and  the  US  is  in part  the  counterpart  of  her  deficit on  raw 
materials.  Still, Japan's gains  in  competitiveness  appear  to  have 
surpassed  those  required  just  to  achieve  balance  between  its deficit 
on  primary  commodities  and  its surplus  on  manufactures.  Japanese 
industry and  government  consciously  concentrated on  an  export  strategy 
promoting  a  few  sectors.  This  so  called "laser-beam approach"  (Lehmann 
1984)  explains  in  part  continuous  above-average  productivity growth  in 
these  sectors  of  the  Japanese  industry.  Selection of  these  sectors was 
done  according  to  the development  and  the  forecasts  of  future 
development  of  demand  in  the  domestic  market.  It was  therefore  assumed 
that  domestic  market  developments  mirror  fairly accurately development 
of  demand  in  the other  industrialised nations. 
3.  Real  wage  growth:  Real  wage  growth  in  Japan,  although  keeping  pace 
with  European  developments,  has  tended  to  lag  behind  labour 
productivity gains  in  most  recent  years,  except  those  following  the 
first oil  shock.  On  the other  hand,  real  wages  and  associated  costs 
like  social  security  in  most  European  countries were  outstripping 
productivity gains  until  the  beginning  of  the  '80s,  when  this trend 
was  reversed  in the  European  countries.  Combined  with  faster 
productivity growth  in Japan  than  in  Europe  and  the  USA,  this  has 
resulted  in  improved  cost  competitiveness  of  Japanese  exports  (Jones 
1985) 
- 14  -Table  7 
Real  wages,  productivity and  the terms of trade 
Annual  growth  rates 
Terms of trade 
Warranted real  Change in  real 
Productivity  wage.'i  Actual real wages  gain(+  )/l~<i(-) 
(=(a)+(b)J 
wage gap 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  I  =(d)-(c)J 
Japan 
1975-79  3.8  -0.3  3.6  2.2  -1.4 
1979-83  2.4  -0.8  1.6  0.7  -0.9 
1983-86  3.3  1.1  4.4  1.9  -2.4 
1975-86  3.2  -0.1  3.1  1.6  -1.5 
USA 
1975-79 
1979-83 
1983-86 
1975-86 
4 Major European Countries 
1975-79 
1979-83 
1983-86 
1975-86 
Sourc~:  OECO Secretariat. 
lkfinitions of  variabl~s: 
Productivity= real GOP/Total employment 
0.9  -0.1 
0.2  0.3 
1.4  0.2 
0.7  0.1 
3.1  0.1 
1.3  -0.1 
1.8  0.6 
2.1  0.2 
Terms of trade gain =terms of trade as per cent of GOP at previous year's prices. 
Real wages =  compensation per employee/private consumption deflator. 
0.7  1.0 
0.5  0.4 
1.6  1.2 
0.9  0.8 
3.3  2.3 
1.2  1.1 
2.5  1.5 
2.3  1.6 
The  relatively  slow  growth  of  real  wages  is  related to  the 
characteristics of  the  Japanese  labour  market  and  to  the  system of 
industrial  relations  that  prevails  in  the  Large  Japanese  firms. 
Particularities of  this  system  are  Lifetime  employment  in  most  of  the 
Large  firms,  seniority wage  setting,  bonuses  Linked  to profits  and 
company-based  unions.  This  system  strengthens  employees•  commitment  to 
the  company  and  its  Long-run  vitality,  Leading  to  wage  settlements 
that  are  compatible  with  company  interests.  During  the  annual  spring 
wage  negotiations  - the  so  called  "Shunto"  initiated in  1955  - company 
performance  is a  primary  consideration  recognized  by  both  management 
and  Labour.  Japanese  Labour's  willingness  to accept  moderate  wage 
increases  after  the  1973  and  1979 oil  shocks  {despite  rising 
inflation)  helped  prevent  the  unleashing  of  a  prolonged  wage-price 
spiral,  something  that  did  occur  to  a  greater or  lesser extent  in  all 
European  economies.  Further,  collective decision  making  and, 
- 15  -
0.3 
-0.1 
-0.5 
-0.1 
-1.0 
-0.1 
-1.0 
-0.7 indirectly  related  to this,  the  high  level  of quality controls  in 
Japanese  enterprises  contribute  to productivity and  competitiveness 
(Uchiyama  1986). 
For  exporters  to the  Japanese  market,  the  slow  growth  of  wages  has  a 
negative effect  since it  limits  the  growth  of  domestic  demand  and  thus 
of  imports. 
4.  Terms  of  Trade:  Japan's  terms  of  trade  have  declined  substantially 
since  the  1960s  (6)  <see  figure  2)*. 
Figure  2 
JAPANESE TERMS OF TRADE 
EXPOf<T  UNIT  VALU[/IMPOr<T  UNIT  VALUE 
1980 = 1 
2.1 
1.9 
1.7 
~Lw--._1  __.___.I _  _..._I _....___LJ_L_LL_LL_L__.__._I  __,_I  __._-LI__.I___..___.l._I~L_.L_J 0.9 
1  Y9s1  1964  1967  1970  197~~  1976  1979  1982  1985 
- 16  -This  decline  is composed  of  a  relatively slow  increase  in export  unit 
values  and  a  faster  rise  in  import  unit  values,  especially during  the 
periods  in the  1970s  in  which  prices  of  raw  materials  rose  sharply. 
Some  of  the  movement  in the  terms  of  trade  reflects exchange  rate 
changes,  but  price developments  also  influence it. 
The  pricing strategy of  Japanese  exporters  has  also  tended  to enhance 
Japan's  competitivenes$.  Japanese  wholesale  prices often  increased 
more  rapidly  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  than  export  prices,  suggesting 
that  export  profitability was  squeezed  over  much  of  the  period,  while 
Japanese  exporters  expanded  their world  market  share.  In  more  recent 
years  the  gap  narrowed,  but  still Japanese  exporters  have  tended  to 
accept  lower  profit  margins  rather  than  to  resort  to  sharp  increases 
in  export  prices  during  periods of  fast  yen  appreciation.  This  pricing 
behaviour  has  helped  improve  Japan's  competitive  position and  preserve 
or  increase  the  global  market  share of  Japanese  exports. 
C.  The  capital balance,  savings and  foreign  investment 
Capital  balance:  In  a  period  of  low  international mobility of  capital 
(such  as  that  prior  to  1979),  so  called  "flow"  models  of  exchange  rate 
determination  would  predict  that  trade  flows  may  have  an  impact  on  the 
exchange  rate.  This  would  be  so,  since  capital  controls  and  low  capital 
mobility  in general  prevent  a  capital  account  surplus  from  emerging  to 
finance  a  current  account  deficit,  so  that  the  exchange  rate will  have  to 
depreciate  in  order  to  bring  about  a  reduction of  the  current  account 
imbalance.  That  link  becomes  less  transparent  when  increased  capital 
mobility  (due  for  example  to  financial  liberalisation)  permits  a  high 
degree  of  capital  inflows  <or  outflows  in  the opposite  case). 
With  capital  mobility,  current  account  developments  can  still influence 
the  exchange  rate  through  a  variety of  channels,  the  most  important  of 
which  are: 
- 17  -a)  Unanticipated  current  account  developments  which  may  affect  the 
exchange  rate  by  revealing  new  information about  changes  in  long-run 
competitive positions  among  countries. 
b)  Current  account  movements  which  may  also  influence  the exchange  rate 
through  a  portfolio balance  channel,  because  current  account 
disequilibria  result  in a  redistribution of  wealth  among  countries and 
because  investors  in different  countries  may  have  different 
preferences  with  respeqt  to the  currency denomination  of their 
investments.  Due  to this  imperfect  substitutability between  assets 
denominated  in different  currencies,  exchange  rates will  move  to 
re-equilibrate asset  markets. 
c>  Intertemporal  considerations;  exchange  rates will  have  to adjust  at 
some  time  so  as  to prevent  current  account  imbalances  from  becoming 
unsustainably  large; 
d)  Underlying  economic  developments  of  real  variables  Clike  growth  and 
productivity)  which  influence  both  the  exchange  rates  and  current 
accounts  and  may  cause  them  to move  together. 
Japan's  capital  balance  is the  counterpole of  its trade balance,  showing 
persistent and  increasing capital exports.  Japan  has  become  the  world's 
biggest  capital exporter.  Some  economists  (Feldstein  1987>  argue  that  the 
persistent  Japanese  trade  surpluses do  not  pose  any  problems  as  long  as 
capital  exports  can  guarantee  an  efficient  recycling of  these  surpluses. 
The  crucial  point  is the  use  made  of  these  capital exports, that  are 
increased due  to the  high  Japanese  saving  rates  <Kanamori  1987>. 
A recent  paper  by  the  World  Institute for  Development  Economics  Research 
(WIDER)  suggests  that  since  Japan  will  be  unable  to absorb  fully  its 
domestic  saving,  it will  need  to  continue to  rely on  current  account 
surpluses  in order  to  continue  channelling excess  savings  abroad.  WIDER 
proposes  that  to counteract  the  global  contractionary  impact  of  any 
reduction  in  the  US  fiscal  and  trade deficits,  Japan  should  redirect  the 
- 18  -surplus  towards  financing  productive  capital  formation  in  the  developing 
countries.  Thus,  Japan's  savings  represents  a  large potential  source  of 
investment  in  developing  countries  (WIDER  1986). 
Savings:  Secular  development  in  Japanese  savings  and  investment  have 
contributed  to  the  tendency  towards  persistent  current  account  surpluses 
(7).  The  Japanese  savings  rate  has  been  remarkably  high  since  the 
mid-1950s  by  comparison  with  most  other  countries,  while  private 
investment  did  not  keep  up.  After  1970  the  share of  private  investment  in 
GNP  fell  back  to  about  15~ of  GNP  and  has  remained  stable at  around  that 
level  in  recent  years.  The  private savings  ratio,  however,  did  not  fall 
in the  '70s  and  even  increased  temporarily  in the  aftermath of  the  1973 
oil price  hike  as  the  heightened  uncertainty and  rising  inflation  led 
households  to  save  more  in order  to  rebuild  the  real  value  of  their 
financial  assets.  The  personal  savings  ratio  in  Japan  for  1985  (as  a 
percentage  of  personal  disposable  income)  was  22%,  compared  to  13%  for 
Germany,  12%  for  Canada,  12%  for  the  UK  and  5%  for  the  USA  {Johnson  and 
Loopesko  1986,  Yamaguchi  1987). 
Public  sector  spending  in  Japan  generally  increased over  the  1970s.  By 
1979,  the  general  government  deficit  as  a  share of  GNP  had  reached  4,8%, 
thereby  absorbing  some  of  the  private sector  savings,  but  since  1979 
Japanese  fiscal  policy  has  been  oriented  towards  reducing  the  level  of 
the fiscal  deficit,  Largely  by  reducing  government  spending,  with  the 
goal  of  eliminating  bond  financing  of  the  central  government  deficit  by 
1990. 
Some  factors  may  lead  to a  ?ecline  in  savings  over  time,  but  the  prospect 
that  the  gap  between  savings  and  domestic  investment  will  be  completely 
eliminated  in  the near  future  is  small.  The  most  important  factor 
influencing  savings  is the  age  structure of  the  population.  With  the 
rapid  ageing  in  the  Japanese  population  (the  share of the  population over 
65  is  projected to  rise  to  16%  by  2000  and  to  20%  by  2020),  those 
currently  in  an  earlier stage  of  the  life cycle are  saving  for 
retirement.  With  a  larger population  over  65  in the  future,  a  decline  in 
the  savings  rate  is expected.  Other  factors  influencing the  high  Japanese 
savings  ratio  like precautionary motives,  housing  <the  average  Japanese 
- 19  -home  costs  nearly 8  times  average  annual  income  and  mortgage  interest  is 
not  tax  deductible),  children's education  and  marriage  and  tax-free 
interest  on  small  savings  accounts,  may  change  Less  over  time,  so  that 
the  Japanese  savings  ratio will  remain  relatively  high  also  in  the 
future. 
Government  policy  can  influence  the  savings  ratio mainly  through  the 
following: 
a)  Housing  investment 
b)  Tax  treatment  of  savings. 
The  Maekawa  Report  (of  April  1986)  on  possibilities for  medium-term 
structural  change  aimed  at  reducing  the  Japanese  external  imbalance 
recommended  abolition of  the  tax  exemption  on  small  savings  accounts  and 
urged  a  sweeping  reform  of  Japanese  housing  policy  (through  tax 
deductions  for  housing,  stabilization of  land  prices  and  easing of 
regulations  hampering  real  estate development). 
The  structural  features  of  the  Japanese  economy  suggest  that  Japan  will 
tend  to  be  a  net  exporter  of  capital  also  in  the  future.  In  view  of this, 
one  should  not  be  concerned  with  a  reduction  of  the  Japanese  saving 
ratio,  but  rather  with  encouraging  the  most  efficient  and  equitable 
global  redistribution of  Japanese  savings.  A reduction of  Japanese 
savings  and  Japanese  capital  export  would  tend to  reduce  Japanese  net 
forP.ign  investment  and  thus  raise  the  level  of  interest  rates  abroad,  a 
result  that  would  inhibit  economic  recovery  and  growth. 
The  degree  of  influence of  the  saving  rate on  capital  exports  depends  on 
the  stance  of  Japanese  fiscal  and  monetary  policy.  Since  the  beginning  of 
the  '80s,  growth  of  the  public  budget  has  been  reduced  which  has  led  to a 
decrease  in  the  issues  of  new  state bonds.  Combined  with  the  high  real 
interest  rate of  US$  denominated  bonds,  this  led  to  increased  capital 
exports  (Mission  of  Japan  1985). 
- 20  -Table  8 
Interest  rates for state bonds 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
I  Yen  9,21  8,66  8,05  7,42  6,81 
I  Dollar  11,39  13,72  12,92  11,34  12,48 
Source:  Bank  of  Japan,  Economic  Statistics Monthly 
Table  9 
Long-ter• capital •ove.ents 
1985 
6,34 
10,97 
1986 
5,14 
7,81 
US$  •illion 
!Foreign capital* 
I  Direct  investments 
I  Portfolio  investments* 
I  Import  credits 
I  Loans 
I  Bonds 
I  Others 
I 
!Japanese  capital 
I  Direct  investments 
I  Portfolio  investments 
I  Export  credits 
I  Loans 
I  Others 
I 
!Net* 
!Current  balance 
I 
!Memorandum: 
I  Net  banking  flows 
(minus  sign  indicates  capital  outflow) 
1983  1984  198s  I 
14  759 
416 
8  485 
8 
-37 
5  663 
224 
-32  459 
-3 612 
-16 024 
-2  589 
-8 425 
-1  809 
-17  700 
20  799 
3  570 
7  124 
-10 
-156 
3 
-77 
7  350 
14 
-56  775 
-5  965 
-30  795 
-4 937 
-11  922 
-3 156 
-49  651 
35  003 
-17  560 
17  2731 
6421 
3  8511 
291 
-751 
12  8901 
-641 
I 
-81  8151 
-6 4521 
-59  7731 
-2 8171 
-10  4271 
-2 3461 
I 
-64  5421 
49  1691 
I 
I 
-10  8481 
*  Excluding  foreign  investors'  "Gensaki"  transactions  (bond  transactions 
with  agreements  to  repurchase  usually  within  three months).  Since  the 
liberalisation  in  1979  up  to  the  end  of  1981,  although  short-term  in 
nature,  those  transactions  had  been  classified as  long-term  capital 
movements. 
Note:  Data  for  years  1976  - 82  are  given  in  Table  9 of  OECD  Economic 
Survey  of  Japan  (1985) 
Source:  Bank  of  Japan,  Balance  of  Payments  Monthly.  OECD  Secretariat 
- 21  -Foreign  Investment:  Looking  at  the  composition of  capital outflows,  an 
increasing  tendency  towards  portfolio  investments  can  be  remarked.  Direct 
investment  has  increased,  but  still remains  a  small  percentage of  overall 
capital  outflow.  The  greatest  part  of  capital outflow  was  directed mainly 
to  US  bonds.  In  analogy  to  the  recycling of  OPEC  capital  flows  after the 
two  oil  shocks,  capital  went  first  into short-term assets  and  then  into 
Longer-term  bonds,  while  only during  the  most  recent  years  has  investment 
in  shares  and  other  real  assets  increased,  again mainly  in  the  USA  (Wayne 
1987).  Japan's  regional  distribution of  direct  investment  is as  follows: 
North  America  26,97%,  Middle  East  2,97%,  Europe  11,0%,  Africa  3,37%, 
Oceania  4,24%,  Latin  America  15,64%,  Asia  19,46%,  for  a  total of 
US$  83,65 billion during  the  period  1951-1985. 
Table 10 
Japan's  cumulative  Invest•ent  in Europe 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Food 
Tediles 
lumber &  pulp 
Chemicals 
Ferrous &  non-ferrous metals 
Machiner)' 
Electrical machiner)' 
Transport machinery 
Others 
Subtotal 
c~ses 
39 
121 
2 
Cl6 
309 
1S8 
138 
33 
144 
1,040 
Amount 
$1ft 
73 
193 
0 
216 
261 
214 
400 
419 
312 
2,Q88 
N  o~=~~..;-uf  ~turing  ___  ------- ---·----------·---------
Agriculture &  forestr)' 
Fisher)'  &  Marine  Industries 
Mining 
Construction 
Commerce 
Banking  &  Insurance 
Services 
Transport 
Real  utate 
Others 
Subtotal 
Branch establishment &  expansion 
Re.al  estate 
Total 
Source:  Financial  Times,  13  November  1986 
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3 
5 
11 
18 
1,768 
288 
154 
28 
12 
233 
2,520 
180 
180 
3,920 
1 
2 
863 
44 
2,486 
3,695 
252 
29 
57 
1,027 
8,455 
421 
38 
ll,OOZ 
:;..,,.r.  41•11 Table  11 
Japan's direct  Invest•ent  in Europe  <$•> 
United  Kingdom 
Netherlands 
West  Germanr 
Luxembourg 
France 
Belgium 
Switzerland 
Spain 
Ireland 
USSR 
ltalr 
Othen 
Europe total 
fiscal year 1984 
Cases  Amount  Share 
68  318  3.1 
30  452  4.5 
48  245  2.4 
7  315  3.1 
50  117  1.2 
11  71  0.7 
22  229  2.3 
11  140  1.4 
1  1  0.0 
6 
15 
269 
22 
27 
1,937 
0.2 
0.3 
19.1 
fiscal  year 1985 
Cases  Amount  Share 
85  375  3.1 
36  613  5.0 
48  172  1.4 
12  300  2.5 
60  67  0.5 
10  64  0.7 
15  60  0.5 
8  9l  0.7 
5  81  0.7 
11 
21 
313 
32 
55 
1,930 
0.3 
0.5 
15.8 
Source:  Financial  Times,  13  November  1986 
Cumulative fY  1951-1985 
Cases  Amount  Share 
1,048  3,141  3.9 
294  1,687  2.0 
758  1,343  1.6 
83  1,216  1.5 
690  819  1.0 
242  743  0.9 
213  663  0.8 
14S  514  0.6 
58  260  0.3 
6  193  0.2 
138  180  0.2 
242  243  0.3 
3,920  11,002  18.2 
Sou•u•  M•li 
At  present  there  are  about  250  partly or  wholly-owned  Japanese  production 
sites  in  13  countries,  making  a  broad-range  of  products  from  cars  and 
consumer  electronic  equipment,  Lighters,  zip  fasteners,  ball bearings, 
construction  equipment  and  machine  tools.  The  biggest  investments  are  in 
the  U.K.  <12  400  persons  employed)  and  West  Germany  (9  100  employed 
persons)  with  France  (10  000),  Spain  <11  600)  and  the  Netherlands 
catching  up.  Total  direct  investment  in  Europe  is  relatively small, 
amounting  to  $US  11  billion by  the  beginning  of  1986,  i.e.  less  than  half 
of  Japan's  stake  in  the  US  and  smaller  than  that  in  both  Asia  and  South 
America.  Growth  of  Japanese  investment  during  1985  was  almost  stagnant. 
Europe's  relative share  is  unlikely  to  rise  and  according  to  Japan's 
Ministry  of  Trade  and  Industry  (MITI)  forecasts  it will  even  decline  in 
the  future,  since  Japanese  foreign  investment  is expected  to  continue  to 
be  focused  on  the  Large  and  homogeneous  North  American  market  and  on  the 
fast-growing  countries  of  Australasia. 
At  present,  Japanese  companies  manufacture  little more  than  2%  of  their 
output  overseas,  but  MITI  forecasts  that  about  a  fifth of  the  country's 
big  manufacturers  will  be  producing  20%  of  their output  overseas  within 
10  years.  In  Europe  this  investment  might  be  directed  towards  areas  where 
the  Japanese  have  so  far  been  weak  Like  the  service  industries.  In 
financial  services the  Japanese  have  quickly  become  a  dominant  global 
influence. 
- 23  -Many  uniform  operating characteristics are displayed  by  the  Japanese 
across  Europe,  together  with  some  country-by-country differences.  A 
quarter of all Japanese  business  ventures  are  in electronics.  The  highest 
rate of  fully-owned  subsidiaries are  to be  found  in the  UK,  West  Germany 
and  the  Netherlands,  while  in Spain,  France  and  Ireland the  Japanese  have 
sought  or  have  been  required to accept  more  joint ventures. 
The  average  size of  Japanese  plant  is small.  According  to surveys,  about 
a  third  showed  sales of  less  than  US$  5 million per year,  and  only  a 
sixth attained sales of  between  US$  20  and  100  million. 
The  Japanese  tend  to bring to  Europe  many  of their  indigenous  production 
practices  though  they  show  considerable flexibility  in fitting  in with 
local  operating cultures.  The  Japanese  are  more  apt  to modify  their own 
company  ethos  than  many  US  firms.  They  tend only to  keep  a  firm  grip  in 
engineering,  with  senior engineering  and  quality management  posts 
normally  retained  in their own  hands. 
Japanese  direct  investment  overseas  is made  for  a  variety of  reasons  and 
not  just  for  profitability, at  least  not  in the  short  run.  Trade 
friction,  anti-dumping  duties,  export  quotas  and  intense political 
pressure  are  pushing  the  Japanese  into significantly more  investment  than 
would  have  been  made  for  good  business  reasons  alone.  The  Japanese 
exports  which  have  attracted price  controls, or  anti-dumping  duties  from 
the  Commission,  are  those  that  the  Japanese  make  or  plan  to make  in 
Europe.  These  include videocassette  recorders,  electronic typewriters, 
photocopiers  and  construction equipment.  Thus,  it can  be  said, that  if 
the  Community  wants  to attract more  investment  from  Japan,  it should  keep 
up  the pressure. 
Among  the  reasons  for  Japanese  preference  for  investment  in the  USA  and 
Australasia  as  against  Europe  are  the  big  integrated  US  market,  the  low 
cost  situation  <especially  labour  costs>  in  Asia,  less  regulation  into 
USA  and  Australasia  and  the  cultural  environment,  where  Europe,  with  its 
various  cultures  and  languages  presents more  of a  challenge  than  the  US. 
Also,  Japanese  companies  located  in  Europe  complain  that  local  suppliers 
do  not  often meet  their standards  in terms  of quality and  delivery times. 
- 24  -A number  of  factors  have  contributed  recently to  make  France  an 
attractive environment  for  Japanese  investment.  These  include 
simplifications  in administrative procedure  and  red  tape,  the  new  Liberal 
and  free-market  oriented policies,  the  programme  to privatise the  main 
French  nationalised  industrial  and  financial  groups,  as  well  as  a 
generally productive  workforce  and  an  encouraging  labour  relations  record 
in  recent  years.  Japanese  interest  in  France  has  become  such  that  France 
is  now  the  leading  European  country  for  Japanese  investment  in  terms  of 
the  number  of  plants  in operation or planned.  By  the  end  of  1986  there 
were  50  Japanese  factories  in  service. 
By  the  end  of  1986  there  were  40  wholly  owned  Japanese  firms  operating  in 
the  UK  <19  of  which  in electronics).  Japanese  total direct  investment  is 
estimated at  about  US$  3,14 billion,  Japanese  investment  remains  low 
compared  to  US  and  German  investment.  In  1985  Japanese  companies  made  13 
investment  decisions  in  the  UK  as  against  158  by  US  and  46  by  German 
companies.  But  Japanese  firms  are  very  important  in the  financial 
services, accounting  for  about  25  000  persons  employed  Cas  against  12  400 
in manufacturing).  There  are  more  than  270  Japanese  companies  which  have 
some  form  of operation  in  the  UK  ranging  from  very  small  sales outlets to 
the  big securities  houses.  23  Japanese  mainstream  banks  have  offices  in 
the  centre of  London,  together  with  20  offices of  regional  banks,  15 
wholly-owned  merchant  banks,  more  than  20  securities  houses  and  10 
portfolio  investment  life  insurance companies. 
Direct  investment  from  Japan  in  Germany  up  to  the  end  of  1985  totalled 
US$  1,34 billion, to the  Netherlands  US$  1,69 billion.  Investment 
concerned  mainly  consumer  electronics with  some  recent  ones  in  dyes, 
scientific  instruments,  computer  peripherals  and  advertising. 
Japanese  direct  investment  in  Spain  amounted  by  1986  to  US$  420  million. 
Financial  liberalisation  in  Spain  may  attract more  Japanese  firms  in this 
sector,  where  4  Japanese  banks  already  have  full  branches  (8). 
- 25  -Japanese  direct  investment  in  Europe  especially in the  form  of  joint 
ventures  is seen  by  many  European  academics  and  businessmen  with 
mistrust.  Some  academics  (9)  argue  that  the  flood  of  international  joint 
ventures  merely  represents  a  new  phase  in  the  competition  between  Far 
East  and  West,  in  which  the  Japanese  are  building ever  more  managerial 
and  technological  competence,  while  western  companies  surrender ever  more 
control  over  their competitiveness.  According  to this view,  the ultimate 
aim  of  most  Japanese  companies  in their partnerships  with  the  West  is not 
to  co-exist  but  to extract  their partner's core of skills and  then either 
disarm  him  in  an  ever-growing  spiral of dependence,  or  break  loose  and 
compete  with  him  directly.  The  Japanese  usually try to annexe  the other 
partner's skills and  to gain  control over  its technology,  in order to 
relegate  the other partner to mere  product  distribution and  the  provision 
of  less  than  critical contributions.  Yet  another  but  less obvious  source 
of  advantage  to most  Japanese  companies  in partnership with  the  West  is 
the greater ability of  their organisations to  learn  from  their partners. 
This  results  in part  from  Japan's  long  tradition of  selective absorption 
and  adaptation of  foreign  ideas  and  technology,  and  also  from  the quality 
of  vertical  and  horizontal  communication  in Japanese  companies.  By 
contrast  the  greater specialisation of  tasks  and  responsibilities of 
western  companies  makes  the  assimilation  and  use  of  complex  know-how  more 
difficult. 
In  general,  the  Community  is concerned  at  the  type  of  Japanese  investment 
in  Europe,  as  only one-fifth of it is  in the  industrial  sector  and  in 
many  cases it seems  intended to promote  Japan's  export  infrastructures. 
Certain of  its  investments,  as  mentioned  above,  have  involved  products  in 
respect  of which  the  Community  has  taken  action against  Japan  on  the 
grounds  of  unfair trading.  However,  Japanese  investment  in  the  Community 
is  currently ten  times  greater than  Community  investment  in  Japan.  This 
is  not  due  to any  lack  of  interest  by  European  firms,  but  to difficulties 
they  have  encountered  in establishing themselves  in  Japan,  due  to both 
legal  and  cultural  reasons.  European  banks  established  in  Japan  still 
encounter  great  difficulties  in spite of  the  Japanese  authorities' 
liheralisation programme.  They  are  unable  to be  competitive  because  of 
the  excessive  cost  of  the  funds  with  which  they  have  to operate,  due  to 
Japanese  regulations.  The  Commission  is  continuing talks with  the 
- 26  -Japanese  authorities with  a  view  to a  speeding  up  of  the  liberalisation 
of  the  financial  and  monetary  markets.  In  December  1986  the  Community  and 
.Japan  agreed  to set  up  and  finance  an  industrial  cooperation  centre with 
the  aim  of  helping  European  firms  gain  access  to  the  Japanese  market,  for 
example  through  appropriate  training  and  the  provision of  useful 
information  on  that  mandate.  The  centre will  run  for  a  trial period of 
two  years  and  was  opened  in  Tokyo  on  2  June  1987. 
The  Euroyen  market:  In  contrast  to the  relatively weak  Japanese  direct 
investment  in .Europe,  the  Euroyen  market  has  blossomed.  This  has  been  due 
to the  traditionally high  Japanese  savings  rate,  related to the 
insufficiency of .Japanese  bonds  profitability and  the  liberalisation of 
the  national  financial  regulations,  which  have  facilitated capital 
export.  Lastly,  the  Japanese  financial  companies  have  showed  unequalled 
dynamism  and  aggressiveness  on  the  international  financial  markets. 
According  to  BIS  statistics, Japanese  banks  were  holding  by  the  end  of 
September  1986  32%  of  international activities, of  reporting  banks,  as 
aqainst  23%  only  two  years  ago,  thus  taking the  first  place  in 
international operations  which  belonged  before to  American  banks. 
Euroyen  emissions  increased three  times  between  1985  to  1986,  mainly  due 
to  Japanese  investors  demand  for  bonds  that satisfied their needs 
<immediate  higher  return and  possibility of  fiscal  deduction,  for 
example.) 
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~· Table  12 
International bonds  Market  (billion dollars> 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  I 
!Dollar out  of  which  32,7  48,2  43,9  69,6  101,2  123,3  I 
1:  Euromarket  25,8  42,2  39,2  65,3  96,5  117,2  I 
1:  national  market  6,9  6,0  4,7  4,3  4,7  6,1  I 
IDM  1,4  3,3  4,0  7,7  11,2  16,9  I 
IYen:  out  of  which  3,1  3,9  4,1  6,1  12,9  23,5  I 
I  Euromarket  0,4  0,6  0,2  1,2  6,5  18,7  I 
I  National  market  2,7  3,3  3,9  4,9  6,4  4,8  I 
I  Swiss  Franc  8,1  11,3  13,5  13,1  14,9  23,4  I 
I  Sterling  1,4  2,0  3,0  5,6  6,7  10,8  I 
I  ECU  0,2  0,8  2,2  2,9  7,0  7,0  I 
I  Canadian  Doo llar  0,7  1,2  1,1  2,2  2,8  5,4  I 
I  French  Franc  0,6  0,2  I  0,2  I  1,5  3,9  I 
I  Others  4,6  I  4,6  I  5,1  4,3  I  9,6  12,2  I 
1------------------------------------------------------------------------
I  Total,  gross  I  52,8  I  75,5  I  77,1  I  111,5  I  167,8  I  226,4  I 
!Minus  reimbursements:  I  I  I  I  I  I 
I  normal  I  I  I  17,1  I  16,3  I  16,7  I  23,3 
I  anticipated  I  I  I  1,5  I  3,2  I  18,6  I  41,1 
I  Total, net  I  I  I  58,5  I  92,0  I  132,5  I  162,0 
Source:  Jean  Marie  Kertudo  1987 
The  share of  Euroyen  increased to about  10%  of  the  international  bond 
market  by  1986,  reaching  the  second  place  of  importance after the dollar 
and  in equality  with  the  Swiss  franc  <Kertudo  1987). 
Financial  liberalisation  in  Japan:  A particular characteristic of  Japan 
is the  debt  financing  of  enterprises,  with  borrowed  funds  exceeding  more 
than  six  times  owners'  equities,  although  there is a  falling  tendency  in 
this  trend.  Low  interest  rates  made  borrowing  cheap.  Also,  the  strong 
relationship  between  financial  institutions  and  their- corporate  clients, 
big  commercial  banks  being often  part  of  a  large  corporate  group, 
contributed to this  trend.  Since  the  late 1970s  however,  Japanese 
companies  have  made  major  changes  in  the  way  they  finance  their 
businesses,  an  important  one  being  the  increased  use  of  capital  markets. 
While  corporate  bond  issues  accounted  for  only  5p9%  of  funds  raised  in 
the early 1970s,  this  percentage  had  risen  to  20%  by  1983. 
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I 
I 
I 
I The  Japanese  government  has  taken,  and  has  plans  to take,  various 
measures  that  will  further  develop  the  capital  market:  1)  Privatisation 
of  public  enterprises will  increase  the  size of  the  securities market;  2) 
The  20%  tax  on  profits made  on  savings  accounts,  which  is  likely to  be 
introduced  soon,  will  reorient  part  of  the  savings  to  the  capital market, 
thus  increasing its  Liquidity;  3)  Investment  funds  and  pension  funds  are 
being  boosted  (investment  funds  represented  35  000  billion yen  in  March 
1987,  an  increase of  60%  on  the  year  before);  4)  The  liberalisation and 
deregulation  measures  are  contributing to a  great  extent  to the 
development  of  the  capita~ market. 
The  following  are  the  most  important  measures  of  Liberalisation  (Speich 
1987): 
1)  In  the  domestic  financial  system  interest  rate ceilings on  Large 
denominated  time  deposits  (~1 billion yen)  and  ceilings  on  banks  money 
market  certificates have  been  removed$  The  EC  Commission  still has  two 
main  requests  to Japan's  Ministry of  Finance:  the total  liberalisation of 
interest  rates  and  the  opening  of  the  money  markets. 
An  important  feature  of  the  capital  markets  in  Japan  is the  separation 
between  banking  and  securities business.  These  barriers are  about  to be 
lifted.  The  Japanese  banks,  hit  by  sluggish  domestic  loan  demand 
challenge  the  traditional turf of  the  securities sector,  which  is the 
most  profitable  in  the  field  of  banking  activities at  the  moment.  At 
present  <since  April  1985),  banks  are  authorised to  issue  money  market 
certificates and  trade  in  government  bonds  on  the  over-the-counter 
market. 
2>  Access  for  foreign  banks  and  borrowers  to  Japanese  markets  has  been 
relaxed.  The  number  of  foreign  corporations  listed in  Tokyo  will  be  75  by 
the  end  of  1987,  as  opposed  to  SO  in  New  York~  Also,  the  freeing  of 
restrictions on  the  use  of  different  sources  is also  taking place,  and 
generally  less  collateral  is  required  for  issuers.  The  list of  public  and 
private borrowers  is expanding  and  the  guidance  measures  are  more 
liberal. 
- 29  -3)  The  liberalisation of  the  Euro-yen  market  is accelerating:  Japanese 
corporations  can  easily float  a  yen-Loan  on  the  Euromarket,  and  Japanese 
banks  can  grant  long  and  medium-term  credits  in  yen  to  foreigners.  Bonds 
with  warrants  (10)  are  usually  issued off-shore,  while  convertible  bonds 
are  primarily  issued domestically.  Nearly  all  foreign  groups  wishing  to 
raise  yen  funds  now  use  Euro-markets.  This  growth  of  the  volume  of  funds 
raised  through  this unregul.ated  market  is encouraging  to  a  revival  of  the 
domestic  market  which  has  to  remain  competitive.  The  offshore market 
reached  US$  93,7 billion by  the  end  of  1986. 
Some  major  drawbacks  still  remain:  1)  Short-term money  markets  are 
relatively under-developed;  2)  The  upper  limit  on  smaller deposit 
interest  rates  is still present;  3)  The  regulatory measures  are still 
greater than  in other  financial  centres;  4)  The  off-shore market  is not 
yet  very efficient.  The  accounts  will  be  subject  to  64%  taxes,  which  is 
quite  high  and  may  influence  negatively  the  willingness  of  some  operators 
to  invest  there. 
1.2 Econoaic  policy and  the structure of the Japanese econa.y 
Fiscal  policy  in  Japan  influences  the  structure of  demand  and  thus  of  the 
trade and  capital  balance  and  the  yen's  exchange  rate. 
Consumption  behaviour  and  long  working  hours  indicate  a  living  standard 
that  is  in  reality  Lower  than  what  could  be  expected  according  to  real 
GDP  per  head.  The  Maekawa  (11)  report  of  April  1986  points  out  the 
important  weaknesses  in  infrastructure and  consumption  possibilities.  As 
an  example  of this,  Japanese  rice prices  are  11,5  times  higher  than  US 
domestic  prices! 
During  the  last  decades,  Japan  has  been  partly westernised  in  its 
consumption  and  in general  in  its material  outlook,  but  important 
differences  in  consumption  mentalities still exist.  Japanese  consumers 
are  more  willing to  forgo  consumption  in  certain cases,  while  on  the 
other  side  they  have  high  quality  requirements.  Also,  general  living 
conditions  and  the  social  structure of  the  population  limit  extensive 
- 30  -consumption  CKanamori  1987).  Living  conditions  in the  overcrowded  main 
cities  Limit  drastically consumption  of  furniture  (which  traditionally is 
also  much  simpler  than  in the  West)  and  some  sorts of  household 
equipment.  Domestic  demand  for  cars  is also  less  than  could  be  expected 
due  to the  fact  that  a  person  has  to  show  that  he  has  a  permanent  parking 
space  in order  to  receive  a  traffic  permit  for  a  car.  Prices  for 
foodstuffs  are  very  high,  as  are  also  rents  for  apartments.  Prices  for 
housing  and  Land  are  also extremely  high  compared  to  European  standards. 
Taking  this  into account  ~nd in  addition  to  the  high  saving  rates that 
Japanese  households  have,  available  income  for  consumption  of  other goods 
is  limited.  Japanese  households  thus  forgo  the  consumption  of  goods  that 
all  European  households  consume  to an  important  extent  (for  example,  wine 
and  other  alcoholic  beverages,  or  some  kinds  of  clothes>.  This  of  course 
limits  imports,  combined  with  the  fact  that  some  imports  like  wines  and 
alcoholic  beverages  are  hit  by  prohibitive  import  duties. 
The  weakly-developed  social  security system  contributes  also to  increased 
saving  rates,  since  employees  purchase  additional  security contracts out 
of their  income.  Savings  in  order to buy  own  apartments  or  houses  also 
increase  the  saving  rate,  although  the  future  substitution of  own  living 
space  instead  for  the  payment  of  rent  is  a  consumption  expense. 
Monetary  policy  in  Japan  has  contributed to  the yen's  strength.  Japanese 
monetary  policy  was  on  the  whole  restrictive after 1979. 
In  1985  it became  even  more  so,  bringing about  an  increase of  interest 
rates,  partly  in order  to  reduce  capital  inflow  into dollar-denominated 
assets  (Feldstein  1987).  The  policy  stance  of  the  Japanese  central  bank 
was  reversed  in  1986  with  a  lowering  of  interest  rates.  This  was 
continued  in  1987  with  five  consecutive  cuts  of  the discount  rate up  to 
the  end  of  February  that  brought  it to  a  record  low  of  2,5%.  According  to 
the  Bank  of  Japan's  governor  Satoshi  Sumita,  this was  designed  to  help 
stabilise the  yen  and  promote  steady expansion of  domestic  demand.  This 
represents  a  change  of orientation of  monetary  policy,  at  least  in part, 
because till then  it was  externally oriented.  Western  analysts  have  cast 
doubts  on  the  effectiveness of  monetary  policy measures  to  increase 
- 31  ~ Japanese  consumption  and  thus  increase  Japanese  import  absorption.  Japan 
is already  awash  with  funds  so  that  interest-rate changes  are unlikely to 
modify  consumers  behaviour. 
Fiscal  policy also  influences  the yen's  exchange  rate.  Domestic  demand  by 
the  state diminished  after 1979  due  to  restrictive measures  related 
originally to the  second  oil  shock.  Private demand  did  not  replace state 
demand.  The  reduction of  the  fiscal  deficits  reduced  partly  imports  and 
thus  could  have  a  positiv~ influence  on  the yen's  exchange  rate  (Institut 
der  deutschen  Wirtschaft  1987).  On  the other  hand,  the  reduction  of  the 
budget  deficit  brings  interest  rates  down,  thus  increasing over  the  long 
run  private demand  (an  inverse  crowding-out  effect)  and  capital  outflow; 
both  of  these  have  a  negative  influence  on  the  yen.  In  the  short  term  at 
least,  if it is  accepted that  asset  markets  and  the  capital  balance  (and 
not  the  trade  balance)  influence  the  exchange  rate,  these  tendencies  may 
predominate.  This  may  have  actually been  the  situation  in 1984-1985  and  a 
reversal  of  the  tendency  may  have  started  in  1986.  The  Japanese 
experience  has  its parallel  in  the  USA,  where  during  the  period  1981-1985 
increasing  budget  deficits and  interest  rates  led  to  increased  capital 
inflow  and  trade deficits  and  rising dollar exchange  rates  (Kyriazis  and 
Chryssanthou  1986). 
Under  US  and  EC  pressure,  the  Japanese  government  promised  to  implement 
some  fiscal  expansion  measures  in  1987.  Still, the  reflationary  influence 
of  these measures  remains  doubtful.  The  budget  for  fiscal  1987  (April 
1987  to  April  1988)  proposes  increasing  government  spending  by  just 
0,02%,  the  smallest  increase  in  30  years.  If the  taxout  side of  the 
budget  is  implemented  on  schedule  in  1988,  with  the  introduction of  the 
proposed  sales  tax  delayed  for  another  year,  the  economy  would  get  a 
once-for-all  fiscal  boost  of  about  0,3%  of  GNP.  This  reflation  is  clearly 
insufficient  to  have  serious effects on  Japan's  trade  balance  and 
absorption  of  imports. 
Lastly it must  be  remarked  that  a  valuation  of  the  "correct" exchange 
rate of  the  yen  is difficult  due  to  the  strong  regulatory measures  of 
Japanese  financial  markets  still in  force,  that  limit  foreign  inflow to 
yen-denominated  assets  inside  the  Japanese  market.  The  above-mentioned 
- 32  -opening  of  a  Japanese  offshore  market  in  relation to  the  fast  growing 
Euroyen  market  and  the  capital  liberalisation measures  adopted  recently 
will  change  this situation  so  that  the  yen's  exchange  rates  in  future 
will  reflect  more  correctly  fundamental  economic  conditions. 
1.3 External  relations with  the  EC  and  the  USA 
Trade  between  the  EC  and  Japan  increased steadily after the  1950s.  In  the 
rating of  importance  as  a  trading  partner of  the  EC,  Japan  occupied  the 
27th  position  in  1960,  the  10th  in  1967  and  has  stabilised itself around 
8-12th  position since  then.  Concerning  imports,  Japan  increased  its 
rating  from  the  26th  (1960)  to the  2nd  position  in  1986. 
Table  13 
EC  trade  with  Japan  <•ill  ion  US  dollar> 
1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984  1985  1986 
I  Imports  5968  7234  11105  16650  17064  19405  20016  30675 
!Exports  3982  3623  6072  7842  7560  9334  8893  13989 
EC-deficitl-1986  l-3611  -5033  -8808  -9504  l-10071  l-11123  l-16686 
Source:  Japan  Tariff  Association  Summary  Report,  Trade  of  Japan 
The  main  reasons  for  the  EC  deficits are  the  cultural  characteristics of 
the  Japanese  domestic  market,  Japanese  import  Limitations  and  lack  of 
competitiveness  of  European  products.  Japanese  companies  follow  a 
selling strategy of  high  quality  combined  with  Low  acquisitorial  expense 
and  competitive  pricing.  European  enterprises  have  often  encountered 
difficulties to adapt  to. this situation,  which,  combined  with  relatively 
Low  consumption  of  some  sorts of  goods  and  high  import  barriers,  keeps 
European  import  penetration  Low.  On  the other  hand  it should  not  be 
forgotten  that  Japanese  enterprises  encountered  similar difficulties  when 
exporting  to  European  markets,  which  they  were  able  to overcome  by 
showing  a  high  capacity of  adaptation that  seems  to  be  missing  in  many 
- 33  -European  companies  <Korte  1986,  Okita  1984).  Also,  with  respect  to 
import  barriers,  some  Japanese  imports  do  face  import  barriers  when 
coming  to  the  EC.  In  France  for  example,  about  67%  of  all  imports  face 
some  kind  of  import  restriction,  as  against  only  12%  for  French  impcrts 
to  Japan  (Huggler  197).  Japan  does  of  course also  apply  non-tariff 
barriers  to trade,  as  for  example  a  parking  prohibition  in  some  areas  for 
foreign  private cars,  higher  insurance  payments  for  cars  of  non  Japanese 
manufacture,  to  mention  only  two  cases  (Gandow  1987). 
Due  to  the  existence of  a  multitude  of  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade  in 
all  countries,  it is extremely difficult  to  make  international 
comparisons  in  order  to  find  out  if Japan  is or  is  not  more  protectionist 
than  its  EC  trading partners. 
Even  the  protectionism  index  cannot  be  taken  as  an  absolute  value,  since 
it  refers  only  to  relative  changes  but  does  not  give  any  information 
about  the  original  (base  year)  Level  of  protectionism. 
Figure  3 
Development  of protectionist  safeguards 
(1981- 100) 
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Source:  UNCTAD 
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Assuming  that  this  level  was  higher  in  Japan  than  in  the  EC  in  1981,  even 
its falling  tendency  manifest  since  then  does  not  say  much  about  the 
actual  situation. 
- 34  -Japan's  exports  to the  USA  followed  a  parallel  tendency  to those  of  the 
EC,  with  exports  increasing  at  a  faster  rate during  the  period of  the 
high  dollar exchange  rate.  Increasing  US  trade deficits  forced  the  US 
administration to put  its main  trading partners under  increased political 
pressure. 
Already  by  October  1986  the  US  Secretary  for  Finance,  Baker,  demanded  an 
increase of  the dollar-yen  exchange  rate  from  180  to  160,  in order  to 
facilitate the  reduction  pf  the  US  trade deficit  with  Japan.  Japan  (and 
Germany)  were  repeatedly  ~sked to  follow  more  expansionary fiscal  and 
monetary  policies  (Shimano  1987>. 
After  1985  the  yen  appreciated to a  large  extent  towards  the dollar 
without  bringing  about,  at  least until  mid-1987,  any  appreciable 
reduction  in  the  US  trade deficit, the  reason  being  "perverse"  short-term 
capital  movements,  long  time  lags  in  changes  of  exports  and  imports  and 
in  part  the  structural  nature  of  both  American  deficits and  Japanese 
surpluses  (Wellenstein  1986>. 
Exchange  rate  moves  without  appropriate  changes  in economic  policy both 
in  the  USA  and  in  Japan ·are  not  sufficient  to  solve  the  problem  of  huge 
US  deficits.  Japan's  trade  surplus  totalled  US$  51,5  bn  in  1986. 
- 35  -Chapter  2.  Proble.s of a  strong yen 
2.1  Japan's adaptation and  growth 
Exchange  rate variations  do  have  an  influence  on  trade  flows,  but  only 
with  a  time-lag.  Japanese  exports diminished  by  1.2X  in  volume  in  1986 
(as  against  an  increase of  4.4%  in  1985)  while  imports  increased  by  12.5% 
(as  against  0.4%  in  1985).  Profits of  important  Japanese  companies  were 
reduced,  while  the  number  of  firms  closing-down  also  increased  rapidly, 
reaching  60  per  month  for  the  last months  of  1986.  Wages  have  increased, 
reaching  a  level  above  that  of  France  and  the  UK  and  comparable  to that 
of  the  USA.  Unemployment  also  increased,  reaching  3.2%  in  May  1987  as 
against  2%  for  the entire period  1950-1970,  2.6X  in 1985  and  2.8%  in 
1986.  Unemployment  is  more  serious  than  these numbers  indicate if the 
Japanese  method  of statistical calculation and  loathing of  big  Japanese 
companies  to make  employees  redundant  are  taken  into account. 
Unemployment  reached  5.6%  for  the  15-24  years  age  group  <4.3%  in 1986). 
Exporting  industries  were  obliged to  reduce  employment,  losing  190.000 
working  places  in  the textile sector,  170.000  in transport  equipment 
(cars  and  shipbuilding)  80.000  in the  chemical  industry and  30.000  in the 
metals  sector.  For  the first  time,  external  demand  had  a  negative 
influence  in total  GOP  growth  in  1986  and  1987. 
Table  14 
GOP  changes  in Z 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
IGDP  Total  4.3  3.7  3.1  3.2  5.1  4.3  3.0  3.5 
!Domestic  demand  0.9  2.2  2.8  1.  7  3.7  3.6  4.2  4.0 
!External  trade  3.4  1.5  0.3  1.5  1.3  0.7  -1.3  -0.5 
Source:  "Europe",  30  April  1987 
- 36  -This  conclusion  is borne  out  also by  the  calculation of  the 
Marshall-Lerner  condition  in the  case of  Japan  <12). 
Japanese  businessmen  have  recently  joined the  calls for  changes  in 
government  policies as  their exports  have  diminished. 
The  strength of  the  yen  w~ich reduced  import  prices did  not  always 
stimulate  consumption,  while  it benefited  some  exporting sectors. 
In  the  strongly export-oriented machine-building  sector  for  example, 
input  prices decreased  sharply due  to the yen's appreciation  combined 
with  falling  energy  prices during  1985/86,  so  that  output  prices  in  yen 
could  be  also  reduced,  keeping  the equivalent  in  foreign  currencies 
stable  for  all  the  yen  appreciation  (Tanaka  1987).  Import  price 
reduction  on  the other  hand  seems  not  to  have  benefited  consumers  for  a 
variety of  reasons,  as  for  example  the  strong  regulation of  food  and 
beverages  (Toyoda  1986). 
Persistent  US  deficits with  Japan,  even  after the  yen's  exchange  rate 
appreciation  in  1986,  resulted  in  new  US  protectionist measures  in  some 
sectors  Like  cars  and  high  technology  products. 
Yen  appreciation  leads  to structural  change  in  the  Japanese  economy,  from 
the  industrial  to  the  services  sector.  Also,  within  the  industrial 
sector,  a  specialisation  in  light-high  technology  industry  is being 
progressively developed,  while  traditional  heavy  industry  <like 
shipbuilding and  steel)  is beginning to  lose  ground.  Japan  seems  to be 
following  the experience of  European  and  us  producers  in  these  sectors 
(Tanaka  1987).  Effects  of  structural  change  are also the  increased 
expenditures  for  research  and  development,  increased diversification and 
direct  investment  all over  the  world.  Japan  follows  a  strategy of 
diversification of direct  investment  on  the  following  grounds:  In  the 
cheap-labour  countries of  Asia  <like  Korea,  Taiwan  etc)  in order to 
remain  competitive  in  some  industrial  sectors where  labour-costs  are  an 
- 37  -important  part  of  total  cost;  in other  industrialised countries,  like 
the  US  and  EC,  in  order  to  take  advantage  of  their big  markets  and  avoid 
import  restrictions that  face  the  same  goods  when  imported  from  Japan; 
and  lastly in developing  countries,  in order to safeguard vital  raw 
materials  for  the  Japanese  industry and  in order to be  present  when  these 
countries develop  their full  economic  potential  in the  future  (Nakamura 
1987>. 
A continuously  strong  yen  over  a  long  period will  result  in  further 
structural  changes,  where,  industry will orient  itself increasingly to 
supply  a  growing  domestic  demand  for  consumer  goods  and  where  exports 
will  gradually  lose  some  of their present  importance. 
2.2 Monetary  and  trade proble•s of the  EC 
In  the  strongly  interdependent  world  of  today,  EC-Japanese  relations 
cannot  be  separated  from  US-Japanese  and  US-EC  relations.  In  the 
monetary  field  three  cases  can  be  distinguished: 
1.  US  dollar and  yen  appreciate at  the  same  time.  This  is the  most 
favourable  case  for  the  European  Monetary  System,  since  capital 
outflows  from  European  currencies to the dollar and  the  yen  keep  the 
DM  (main  substitution currency  inside the  EMS  for dollar and  yen, 
Kyriazis  and  Chryssanthou  1986)  weak,  so  that  no  external  tensions 
materialize  inside  the  EMS  and  no  realignments  are  necessary.  This 
was  the  situation during  1984-1985  and  no  realignments  inside the  EMS 
took  place.  Further a  strong dol,lar  and  a  strong  yen  would  enhance 
in part  European  export  competitiveness,  although  protectionist 
measures  in  the  US  might  increase  (as  happened  in  reality during 
1984-85). 
2.  Dollar  devalues,  yen  appreciates.  This  is the  period  1986 till now, 
and  is  less  favourable  for  the  EMS.  Dollar  devaluation  results  in 
capital outflows  from  dollar denominated  assets  to the  yen  and  mainly 
among  the  EMS  currencies,  the  DM.  This  results  in  tensions  building 
- 38  -up  inside  the  EMS  that  make  realignments  necessary.  This  actually 
happened  after 1985,  with  two  major  realignments  following  a  two  and 
a  half  year  period of  no  realignment.  Depreciating dollar  lowers  EC 
competitiveness  on  the  US  markets,  while  appreciating  yen  tends  to 
ameliorate the  EC's  current  account  situation with  Japan. 
3.  Devaluin'g  dollar and  yen.  This  situation,  which  has  not  yet  arisen, 
would  be  the  worst  from  a  European  standpoint,  resulting-in  increased 
capital  inflows  into mainly  the  OM  both  from  dollar  and  yen 
denominated  assets,  bringing  high  tensions  inside the  EMS  and 
reducing  EC  competitiveness. 
Japanese  exports  to  the  USA  increased during  1985/86  by  23.2%  while 
exports  to the  EC  increased  by  47.5%,  with  the  yen  appreciating  by 
95%  towards  the dollar  and  only  by  9%  towards  the  ECU. 
The  difference  in the  increase of  exports to the  EC  as  against  the 
USA  is probably due  not  only to the different  degree  of  the  yen's 
appreciation  but  also  to political pressure and  specific  agreements 
and  regulations  of  trade.  Japanese  exporters  seem  to  have  tried to 
replace  US  export  losses  due  to the yen's  appreciation and  increased 
protectionist  measures  by  export  gains  on  the  EC  market.  Bilateral 
US-Japan  agreements  on  specific  subjects are  sometimes  also to the 
EC's  disadvantage,  as  for  example  the  agreement  on  semiconductors 
that  resulted  in a  100%  increase of  world  market  prices, which  was  a 
disadvantage  for  European  enterprises that  are  highly  import 
dependent  (Ratjen  1987>. 
Japan  did  not  introduce  new  protectionist measures  during this period 
and  even  eased  some  of  the existing ones,  but  EC  companies  still 
encounter  great difficulties when  trying to export  to Japan. 
Japanese  custom  duties  and  quantitative restrictions are more  or  less 
at  EC  level,  with  the  exception of  some  categories of  goods  like 
alcoholic  beverages,  some  machine  industry goods  and  agricultural 
goods  (Moorhouse  1986),  but  non-tariff barriers are  much  more 
important  and  very difficult to overcome.  Such  barriers are the 
domestic  Japanese  distribution system,  norms,  standards,  examination 
- 39  -procedures  for  imported  goods,  necessary  certificates etc.  In 
particular  high  technology  imports  find  it very difficult  to 
penetrate  into the  Japanese  market  (Christelow  1986). 
But  it must  also not  be  forgotten  that  some  EC  goods  are  lacking  in 
international  competitiveness,  which  make  them  unable  to compete  in 
the  Japanese  markets,  where  the quality standards,  especially  for 
high  quality goods  are  high.  Increased  competitiveness of  EC  goods 
would  also enhance  th,ir chances  of penetrating the  Japanese  market 
(Huggler  1987>. 
- 40  -Chapter  3.  Possibilities of solution 
3.1  Japanese  Econo•ic  Policy •easures 
In  almost  all  international  meetings  and  conferences  appeals  have  been  made  to 
Japan  to abolish  import  barriers  and  stimulate  internal  demand.  But  even  i1 
;apan itself, influential persons  Like  the  Finance  Minister  Kiichi  Miyazawa 
~nd former  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  Japan,  Harne  Meakawa,  took  position  for 
taking measures  to  correct  Japan's  current  account  disequilibrium.  Both 
criticized the  too  Low  domestic  consumption  and  saw  this as  the  main  element 
tor  the  persistence of  the disequilibria.  Strong  support  and  intervention 
measures  for  Japan's  agriculture,  especially for  rice  production,  have  Led  to 
~/3 of  available  incomes  expenditure  going  for  food.  A deregulation  of 
~gricultural markets  would  ameliorate  the  situation  considerably,  freeing 
available  income  for  other  types  of  consumption  and  presumably  also  for 
imported  goods.  The  deregulation of  agricultural  trade  of  the  USA,  the  EC  and 
Japan  is one  of  the  subjects  of  the  Uruguay  GATT  round.  Mutual  concessions 
may  lead  to progress  in this area. 
It  is  more  difficult  to  change  the  nationalist  outlook  of  Japanese  consumers 
ere  Commission  1987).  Foreign  exporters  must  try to  convince  the  Japanese 
consumers  of  the  quality of  their goods.  This  seems  to  be  easier  for  youngar 
people  in  Japan  who  are  Less  tradition bound  and  more  open  in their outlook, 
so  that  in  the  medium-term  a  change  of  attitude of  the  Japanese  consumer  ca1 
be  expected. 
According  to  the  Venice  Summit  final  declaration,  "Surplus  countries  will 
de~ign their policies  to  strengthen  domestic  demand  and  reduce  external 
surpluses  while  maintaining  price stability"  and  "Those  summit  countries  which 
h.:we  made  significant  progress  in  fiscal  consolidation  and  have  large  exter.1al 
surpluses,  remain  committed  to  following  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  designed 
to  strengthen domestic  growth  within  a  framework  of  medium-term  fiscal 
objectiv~s.  Monetary  policy  should  also  support  non-inflationary growth  and 
foster  stability of  exchange  rates.  In  view  of  the  outlook  of  low  inflation 
in  many  countries,  a  further  market-Led  decline of  interest  rates  would  be 
~:elpful"  C13). 
- 41  -This  seems  to designate  mainly  Japan  and  in  the  second  place  Germany.  Japan 
has  thus  accepted  the obligation  to  implement  a  more  expansionary  fiscal  and 
monetary  policy.  Up  till now,  Japan  has  been  reluctant  to do  so  and  the 
fiscal  stimulus  coming  from  the  197  will  be  minimal,  as  mentioned  above. 
A moderately  expansionary  fiscal  policy  in  Japan,  for  example  through  the 
issue  of  additional  government  debt  papers  that  would  absorb  part  of  the 
savi~gs,  (Kanamori  1987)  is necessary  in order  to  reduce  the  structural part 
of  the  Japanese  current  account  surplus. 
The  Japan  Federation of  Economic  Organisation  (Keidanren)  <14)  supported  the 
implementation  of  an  expansionary  fiscal  policy  as  a  means  of  avoiding 
recession. 
Liberalization and  deregulation of  the  internal  Japanese  market  will 
facilitate  foreign  exports  and  thus  diminish  Japan's  current  account 
disequilibria.  Criticism of  Japan's  non-tariff barriers  by  the  USA  (15),  the 
EC  and  other  countries  has  made  the  Japanese  authorities  implement  a  three 
year  programme  concerning  certificates, tariffs and  standards,  agreed  on 
30.7.85  between  the  EC  and  Japan  and  which  will  facilitate  imports. 
If on  the other  hand  the  yen  continues  to appreciate,  it can  be  expected  that 
Japanese  enterprises will  concentrate  more  on  the  internal  market,  where 
competition  will  increase,  making  import  penetration more  difficult.  In  the 
face  of  an  eventual  deterioration of  the  current  accounts  situation,  Japan  may 
become  once  again  more  reluctant  to  open  its internal  market. 
To  further  reduce  disequilibria,  Japan  must  continue on  the  road  of  financial 
liberalisation initiated a  short  while  ago,  as  mentioned  above.  Although 
there  has  been  progress  in  providing  instruments  that  carry  market-determined 
rates  for  very  large  investors,  there  has  been  very  little progress  for  the 
average  citizen and  there  is  very  little that  is specific  in  sight.  In  Japan, 
unless  an  investor  can  invest  an  amount  in  excess  of  US$  75.000,  and  often  an 
amount  very  much  larger,  he  will  receive  an  artificially  low-interest  rate. 
This  lack  of  fair  return  to  small  savers  hurts  domestic  consumption  and 
domest1c  growth  and  in  fact  subsidizes  the  banking  sector,  being  one  of  the 
reasons  of  its high  international  competitiveness. 
- 42  -Japanese  financial  markets  remain  segmented  and  heavily  regulated  and  are 
still subject  to guidance  from  the  Ministry of  Finance  and  the  Bank  of  Japan. 
Limitations on  maturities  and  denominations,  stamp  taxes  and  other  rigidities, 
still exist  throughout  the  system  and  especially  hamper  the  development  of  an 
efficient  money  market  based  on  market  rates  <Mulford,  1987). 
The  EC  attitude towards  Japan,  as  reconfirmed  by  the  meeting  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers  in  March  1987,  is  based  on  the  following  points: 
1.  Overall  pressure  on  Japan  to  reform  its structures,  to  become  better 
integrated  in  the  fabric  of  rights  and  obligations  constituting the 
international  economic  system  and  to  import  more  from  its trade partners. 
2.  Discussions  with  Japan  on  all specific barriers to  imports.  The  Commission 
has  already  presented its arguments  concerning  wine  and  spirits to Japan 
and  it will  present  dossiers on  three other areas  of  complaint:  dairy 
products,  cosmetics  and  counterfeit  goods. 
3.  Cooperation  with  Japan  in all possible spheres,  especially those  relating 
to  industry  and  research. 
4.  Further efforts within  the  Community  to make  European  industry more 
competitive  and  to  promote  European  products  on  the  Japanese  market. 
3.2  Coordination  and  Cooperation 
Economic  policy  coordination  and  cooperation  have  been  recongnized  and 
reaffirmed  as  aims  by  the  Venice  Summit,  but  problems  remain  as  to their 
implementation.  Countries  that  can  do  so  (mainly  Japan  and  Germany)  should 
undertake  fiscal  exppnsion,  but  in  view  of  the  Lack  of  any  formal  and  binding 
international  cooperation  agreement  appear  reluctant  to do  so. 
Concerning  monetary  policy the  Venice  Summit  (16)  made  a  commitment  to 
cooperate  closely to foster  stability of  exchange  rates  and  to  strengthen  the 
surveillance of their economies  using  economic  indicators  including  exchange 
rates,  in  particular by:  1)  the  commitment  by  each  country to develop  medium 
- 43  -term objectives  and  projections that  are  mutually  consistent,  both 
individually and  collectively,  and  2)  the  use  of  performance  indicators  to 
review  and  assess  current  economic  trends  and  to determine  whether  there  are 
significant  deviations  from  an  intended  course  that  require  consideration of 
remedial  actions~ 
In  the  area  of  monetary  policy,  the  Venice  Summit  has  achieved  slight 
progress,  continuing on  the  road  of  previous  Summits  and  giving  more  detail  to 
some  points  raised at  the  Tokyo  Summit.  Still, progress  is  insufficient.  In 
the declaration  the  G-7  Ministers  define  additional  appropriate  measures  if 
necessary.  There  is  absolute  silence  as  to  their application,  i.e.  about  the 
actual  stage  of  economic  and  monetary  policy coordination.  The  text  of  the 
declaration  is  thus  ambiguous  and  has  important  omissions.  There  is  no  formal 
obligation  in  the  framework  of  the  surveillance  mechanism  to  intervene,  but 
only  an  obligation  for  consultations  on  the  possibility and  the  need  <or  not) 
to  intervene.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  indication as  to the  type  and  number 
of  surveillance  consultations,  although  semi-officially it is  known  that  the 
G-7  will  meet  three  times  per  year,  the  national  forecasts  being established 
at  the  beginning  of  the  year  and  the  technical  follow-up  being  taken  by  the 
IMF. 
Interventions  in  the  exchange  market  to bring  about  more  orderly conditions 
thus  remain  ad  hoc.  This  represents  some  progress  compared  to  some  years  ago 
<showing  the  willingness  of  the  USA  to undertake  such  interventions  with  the 
support  of  other  countries  in order  to  realize  certain exchange  rate  targets 
for  the dollar,  a  willingness  that  was  totally  Lacking  during  the first  years 
of  thP.  Reagan  administration),  but  it is  not  sufficient  to bring  about  more 
stability on  a  durable  basis.  The  credibility of  any  ad  hoc  agreement  is  very 
limited,  so  that  large  speculative  capital  movements  that  lead  to  huge 
exchange  rate  fluctuations  will  continue  in  the  future. 
A positive element  of  the  Venice  Summit  is that  the  degree  of political 
engagement  to the  aim  of  closer  international  cooperation  is  such  as  to  make 
it more  difficult  than  before  for  participating countries  not  to accept  a 
certain discipline  in  their economic  policy,  giving  also due  regard  to  the 
international  repercussions  of  such  a  policy.  This  again  is quite  a  Long  way 
- 44  -from  the  stance of  the  USA  during  the  first  period of  the  Reagan 
administration,  when  the  US  followed  domestic  economic  policies without  any 
regard  to their  international effects. 
Still, it is necessary  to  go  much  further  in  the  field  of  monetary  cooperation 
in order  to  achieve  more  stability  in  exchange  rates  on  a  long-term  basis  and 
thus  avoid  the  costs of  persistent  misalignments.  From  the  Community  side, 
one  way  to  contribute to  such  a  development  would  be  to  complete  the  EMS  by 
introducing  a  common  external  policy  for  the  ECU  <and  all  EMS  currencies>,  so 
as  to  avoid  tensions  arising  inside the  EMS  exchange  rate  mechanism  due  to 
external  reasons.  An  external  Community  monetary  policy  through  the 
completion  of  the external  side  of  the  EMS  would  strengthen  the  EC's 
bargaining position  in  the  international  monetary  field,  since  it would  be 
present  as  one  entity and  not  as  many  countries  like now.  This  could  induce 
the other two  major  countries,  the  USA  and  Japan,  to  more  willingness  to 
international  cooperation  in  the  monetary  field  (Kyriazis  and  Chryssanthou). 
A better solution to  bring  about  more  equilibrated  relations of  the  EC  with 
Japan  and  the  US  in the  economic  and  monetary  field  would  be  the 
implementation  of  a  formal  tri-polar  international  monetary  order  (17).  Such 
an  improved  international  monetary  system  would  enhance  predictability by 
allowing  the  policy makers  in each  country  to  have  a  better understanding of 
likely policy  reactions  in other  countries.  Predictability would  again  have  a 
dampening  influence  on  speculative  shocks  due  to shifts of  portfolio holdings. 
Through  the  introduction of  a  system  of objective  indicators,  the  system 
should  be  able  to establish  clear  rules  for  "good  citizenship"  in monetary  and 
fiscal  management  and  thus  reduce  the  attempts  at  "beggar  thy  neighbour" 
behaviours.  A system  of  relatively equal  countries  (or  group  of  countries  for 
the  EC)  in  economic  monetary  strength  would  be  more  liable to be  a  system 
where  the  rules  are  observed  than  one  in  which  there  is a  hegemonic  case  <like 
actually more  or  less  with  the  US,  at  least  during  the  period  up  to 1985) 
which  can  to  a  greater or  lesser extent  ignore  the  reactions  of  the 
"dPpendent"  countries.  Equality  has  a  built-in incentive  for  better 
international  behaviour. 
- 45  -Cooperation  leading  to a  system  of  managed  exchange  rates  would  result  in  a 
reduction  of  the  costs  arising out  of  the  high  actual  variability of  the 
exchange  rates.  Situations of  disequilibria  such  as  exist  today  with  high  US 
current  account  deficits- Japanese  surpluses  could  be  more  easily avoided  in 
future.  Also  cooperation  on  more  formal  lines  induces  more  prudent  domestic 
economic  policies,  but  also  makes  any  necessary  adjustment  easier,  since  the 
burden  of  adjustment  can  be  shared  to  a  certain extent  between  the  cooperating 
countries.  Cooperation,  by  Lowering  misalignment  cost  and  exercising positive 
influence  on  growth  and  employment  would  increase  welfare  (Williamson  1983  b) 
<18).  Lastly,  cooperation  Leading  to  the  establishment  of  a  tripolar currency 
are~, with  the  ECU  and  the  yen  developing  into  reserve  currencies 
complementing  the  dollar,  could  bring  about  greater  international stability. 
A tripolar  system  of  managed  exchange  rates  could  include  the  following 
elements: 
1)  A target  zone  for  the  ECU,  the  dollar  and  the yen,  consisting of  fixed 
central  rates  (ECU-dollar,  ECU-yen,  dollar-yen)  and  margins  of 
fluctuations  around  them. 
2)  Interventions  by  the  European  Monetary  Authority  <when  such  an  Authority 
is established)  or  the  European  Fund  for  Monetary  Cooperation  (EFMC),  the 
Federal  Reserve  System  and  the  Bank  of  Japan  in order  to  keep  fluctuations 
inside the  margins. 
3)  A swap  agreement  to  facilitate  the  interventions  of  the  authorities. 
4)  A credit  mechanism  could  eventually  be  established to facilitate 
adjustment  when  long-run disequilibria  appear.  This  mechanism  would 
facilitate adjustments  and  also  promote  the  willingness  to adjust  but  is 
not  fundamental  for  the  implementation of  the  system. 
5)  A system  of  indicators,  separated  in  monetary  and  real.  Monetary 
indicators  would  give  advance  warning  and  the  presumption  to act  (i.e. 
intervene  in  the  exchange  market)  in  situations  of  purely monetary 
disturbances,  like  wages  of  speculation, disorderly  conditions etc.  Real 
- 46  -indicators on  the other  hand  would  indicate when  there  are  disequilibria  . 
in  real  parameter  which  necessitate  realignments  of the  central  rates  and 
an  adjustment  of  economic  policy. 
- 47  -A N N E x<*> 
(*)The  Annex  is taken  from  "US-EC  Monetary  Relations",  by  Nicholas  KYRIAZIS, 
Nicholas  CHRYSSANTHOU,  Economic  Series  Paper  No  8, of  the  Directorate 
General  of  the  European  Parliament. 
- 48  -A proposal for a  Tripolar Exchange  Rate  Agree•ent  among  the  EC,  US  and  Japan 
We  propose  an  exchange  rate  agreement  for  the  EC,  US  and  Japan,  according to 
which,  exchange  rates will  be  managed  in  relation to  reference  rates  (central 
rates>  that  crawl  on  the basis of  the  relative performance  of  countries 
(areas)  in terms  of  ~heir effective wholesale  price  indexes  and  persistent 
deviation of their balances  from  specified targets.  Our  proposal  should  be 
seen  as  an  example  and  a  first  approach  towards  solving the  problem  of 
coordination of  intervention  and  not  as  a  definite solution  in itself. 
In  addition,  this  Annex  deals  with  the  construction of  a  divergence  indicator 
between  the  ECU,  the  US  dollar and  the  Yen,  which  can  show  daily deviations 
from  the  average  of  the  above  currencies.  In  the  absence  of  real  disturbances 
(in this  proposal  persistent disequilibria  in the  basic  balances  and/or 
changes  in  competitiveness  and  trade),  certain signals of  the  divergence 
indicator will  be  considered  as  a  warning  and  a  signal  to  intervene  in the 
exchange  market  in order to  keep  fluctuations  inside  the  margins. 
Our  proposal  for  a  Tripolar  Exchange  Rate  Agreement  between  the  EC,  US  and 
Japan  can  also  be  modified  as  a  bipolar  Exchange  Rate  Agreement  between  the  US 
and  the  EC.  It  can  also  include  other  homogenous  countries  or  areas.  The 
above  proposal  for  exchange  rate  realignments  and  intervention  may  be 
completed  by  a  swap  agreement  and  a  credit  mechanism  which  can  increase  the 
credibility,  and  consequently  the viability, of  the  whole  Exchange  Rate 
Agreement,  but  this is not  covered  by  this  Annex.  The  purpose  of  this  Annex 
is to outline  in more  details  the  proposal  for  an  exchange  rate  agreement 
between  the  EC,  US  and  Japan.  The  role of  intervention would  be  to smooth  out 
disorderly  conditions due  to  speculation or other  short  term  monetary 
disturbances.  If, on  the other  hand,  disturbances are  due  to  long  term 
variables,  such  as differences  in  competitiveness,  inflation, growth  rates etc 
then  the  central  rates  should  be  realigned,  preferably after consultation 
between  the  countries  (or  areas)  concerned. 
The  EC,  US  and  Japan  will  define  a  reference  rate for  the  ECU,  the  US  Dollar 
and  the  Yen  in  terms  of  an  effective exchange  rate which  will  be  expressed  in 
a  common  unit of  account  for  the  purpose  of standard measurement. 
- 49  -This  common  unit of account,  which  may  be  called "International Unit  of 
Account"  CIUA),  will  be  defined  in terms  of  the  following  fixed quantities of 
US  Dollars,  ECU  and  Yen.  See  Table  18. 
Participating 
currencies 
us  Dollar 
ECU 
Yen 
Currencies 
Amounts 
0.362 
0.687 
30.238 
Table  18 
Currencies  weights 
of  an  IUA.  16  July 1984 
0.35 
0.53 
0.12 
Value  of an  IUA  in each  currency 
Central  Rates.  16  July 1984 
1.02661 
1.30612 
249.07708 
The  method  which  has  been  used  to estimate  currency amounts  in an  IUA,  the  currency 
weights  and  the  value  of  an  IUA  in each  currency on  16  July 1984  is described  in the 
Technical  Annex.  The  date  16  July 1984  has  been  chosen  arbitrarily. 
The  FED,  the  EMA  and  the  Bank  of  Japan  are to set margins  around  the  above 
reference  rates  (Central  Rates).  Initially this margin  should be  relatively 
wide,  +10%  and  -10Y.,  in order  to safeguard the flexibility of  the  system.  As 
already mentioned  in the text,  if the  system  works  well,  the margins  will  be 
reduced  accordingly.  Table  19  shows  the  IUA-related  central  rates and  the 
intervention  limits -a band  of  20%- as  well  as  the bilateral  rates and  the  20Y. 
intervention  limites  among  the bilateral central  rates. 
- so  -Table  19 
Related  and  Bilateral Central  Rates  and  Intervention Limits  of  a  Tripolar 
Exchange  Rate  System. 
Related  central  Rates  and  Intervention Limits 
CURRENCY 
1  IUA 
+  10% 
Related  Central 
Rates 
- 10% 
US  DOLLAR 
1.12927 
1.02661 
0.92394 
ECU  \'E~~ 
1.30612  249.07708 
1.17551  224.16900 
Bilateral Central  Rates  and  Intervention Limits 
CURRENCY 
+  10% 
100  us  Bilateral  Central 
dollars  Rates 
- 10% 
+ 10  % 
100  ECU  Bilateral  Central 
Rates 
- 10% 
+10% 
100  Yen  Bilateral  Central 
Rates 
- 10% 
US  DOLLAR 
100 
864.600 
758.999 
707.404 
0.453382 
0.412165 
0.370949 
ECU  YEN 
139.950  26683.300 
127.227 
114.504 
100 
0.57681 
0.52438 
0.47194 
24262.093 
21835.900 
20977.000 
19069.999 
17163.000 
100 
A divergence  indicator  (0  I)  between  the  US  dollar,  the  ECU  and  the  Yen  will 
make  it possible to trace the  movements  in  the exchange  rates of  the  above 
currencies against  the average  movement  and  thereby to identify any  currency 
deviating  from  the average.  Exactly  as  happens  in  the  EMS,  the monetary 
authority of  a  diverging  currency which  crosses  its divergence  threshold 
should  take action. 
- 51  -For  the  calculation of  such  a  divergence  indicator which  can  measure  the 
degree  of movement  of  a  specific  currency - in this proposal  the  US  dollar, 
the  ECU  and  the  Yen  against  a  maximum  divergence  spread  (MDS),  we  need  first 
to calculate the  premium  (P)  or the  Discount  (D)  shown  by  the market  rate of 
the  IUA  in terms  of each  one  of the above  currencies against  their  IUA  related 
central  rates,  and  second,  to  compare  this  result  with  the  corresponding  MDS 
for  each  currency. 
The  MDS  is the  maximum  percentage  by  which  the market  rate  of  the  IUA  ln  tPrms 
of a  specific  currency  in this basket  can  appreciate or depreciate against  the 
IUA  related central  rates of  that  currency,  where  the  latter has  reached  its 
margins  of  fluctuations  of  +  10%  against all the other  currencies  in  the  IUA 
basket. 
For  the  estimation of the  MDS  of  each  currency,  the  following  formula  has  been 
used: 
MDS$  =  +  10%  x  (1-W$) 
MDSECU  =  ~  10%  x  (1-WECU) 
MDSy  =  +  10X  x  (1-Wy  )  en  - en 
Where  W  shows  the weights  of  US  dollar,  ECU  and  the  Yen.  See  Table  Annex  1. 
Table  20  below  shows  the  MDS  of  the  component  currencies of  an  IUA: 
Currency 
US  dollar 
ECU 
Table  20 
MDS 
+  6.  50% 
+  4.70% 
Yen  ± 8.80% 
The  MDS  of  each  currency will  be  expressed  in an  index  of  100.  By  assuming  a 
divergence  threshold of  SOX,  a  currency will  reach  its divergence  threshold 
when  the  DI  gives  a  figure  of  50. 
We  chose  a  threshold of  SOX  in order to ensure that  a  currency  would  always 
reach  its devergence  threshold before one  of  its bilateral  limits.  (In the 
EMS  the threshold  indicator is 75%.  This  has  resulted  in the divergence 
indicator of the  EMS  not  always  full-filling its task, i.e. the bilateral 
limits of  two  currencies  can  be  reached  without  the divergence  indicator 
.  .  th  .  .  .  ) (19)  l  l  .  g1v1ng  e  appropr1ate  warn1ng  •  Ca  cu  at1on  of  the  above  DI  for  each 
currency participating in the  IUA,  is as  follows: 
- 52  -DI$  = 
01 ECU  = 
01Yen  = 
= 
= 
= 
P$  or  D$ 
MDS$ 
PECU  or 
MDSECU 
~I~U~A$~m~a~r~k~e~t_r~a~t~e~-~IU~A~$~c~e~n~t~ra~l_r_a_t_e  _______ x 100 
IUA$  central  rate 
IUAECU  market  rate - IUAECU  central  rate 
~~--~~~~~--~~--~----------- X  100 
IUAECU  central  rate 
IUAYen  market  rate - IUAYen  central  rate 
~~--~~~--~--~----~------------ X  100 
IUAYen  central  rate 
X 100 
0ECU 
X  100 
PYen  or  0Yen 
MDSYen 
X  1QQ 
Whenever  one  of the above  currencies - $,  ECU,  Yen  - crosses  its threshold 
limit - 50%  of the  MDS  - the  monetary  authorities of the  issuing  country will 
be  consulted to undertake  diversified  interventions  in order to keep 
fluctuations  inside the margins.  These  interventions will  be  based  on  the 
daily observations of the  DI. 
However,  if the  currency  continues  to deviate  from  its average,  and  it is 
accompanied  by  warning  signals  from  a  system  of  real  indicators,  the 
diversified  intervention would  not  be  sufficient and  a  realignment  of the 
central  rates and  /or an  adjustment  of economic  policy would  be  more 
appropriate  to  restore equilibrium  in  real economic  parameters. 
The  use  of objective indicators as  a  guide  to changes  in exchange  rates  has 
been  a  familiar  subject  among  pr~fessional and  academic  economists,  since the 
negotiations  for  the  creation of the  Bretton Woods  system.  As  Trevor 
Underwood<ZO>has  said,  the various  proposals for  such  an  objective indicator 
have  been  distinguished by  a>  how  mandatory,  presumptive  or permissive the 
- 53  -response  is to be  b)the size of the changes  advocated  in the  exchange  rates 
and  c>  whether  or not  interference is advocated  in  the existing right  to make 
changes  in exchange  rates. 
Two  types  of  indicators  have  been  involved:  price  indicators  relating to 
levels or  changes  in spot, or  forward  or effective exchange  rates,  and 
quantity indicators which  depend  on  the  level  or  change  in various  measures  of 
international  reserves or the balance of payments. 
In  this proposal  we  will  connect  realignment  of  the  central  rates with  price 
indicators assuming  that  in the medium-term,  a  suitable price  index  may  be  a 
significant variable  in forecasting  the balance of  trade and  competitiveness. 
The  above  "price indicator" will  be  reinforced by  an  other  indicator  showing 
whether  or  not  a  target on  the basic  balance of each  country or  area  has  been 
exceeded.  In  particular, whenever  a  deficit or surplus  in the basic  balance 
of  a  country or area, vis-a-vis the other  countries  in the  system  exceeds  the 
O,SX  of its GOP,  the monetary  authorities of that  country or area,  should 
change  the central  rate of its currency,  in order to avoid  future  opposing 
flow  imbalances. 
Therefore,  when  the basic  balance,  which  includes  the  current  account,  the 
longterm  capital account  and  certain government  capital transactions deviates 
persistently from  its target,  the monetary  authorities will  be  asked  to change 
the  central  rate  in proportion to an  effective  PPP  index,  calculated for  each 
participating currency,  by  dividing  the  issuing country's wholesale  price 
index  by  a  weighted  average  of the wholesale  price indices of  the other 
issuing countries  in the  system,  the  weights  being  the  same  as  these entering 
into the  formula  of each  country or  area  participating in the  IUA.  The 
decision to  introduce a  weighted  PPP  rule  in our  crawling  system,  relies on 
conclusions derived  from  the  OPTICA  Report  (1976)  <21)  according  to which 
wholesale  price  indices are the most  appropriate price indices  for  measuring 
relative inflation and  that  conformity of exchange  rate changes  to inflation 
differential is closer with  a  multilaterally measured  PPP,  that  is by  means  of 
a  double-weighted  index  of  inflation trends  in other countries and  of 
- 54  -effective exchange  rates,  rather  than  with  a  bilaterally-measured  PPP. 
Calculation of  the effective  PPP  index,  P~  for  the  country or area,  i  ,  in 
time  t, is based  on  the  following  formula: 
t 
...  t 
P. 
1  = 
P·t  ____________  _.  ____________ X  100 
- p  )_, wn- i · 
n-i 
where  P;  is the wholesale  price  index  of  the  country i, at  time t, and  w are 
the  weights  which  are given  in table 16. 
We  will  allow  country's  i  related  central  rate to  change  at  the  end  of  each 
quarter  in  proportion to  the  change  of  a  moving  average  of  country's  i 
effective  PPP  index,  the  calculation of  which  is given  below: 
.  . 
'"1:  "'t 
P;  = 0,4P;  -=t-1 
+  0,3P; 
.:!t-2 
+  0,2P; 
.:.t-3 
+  0,1Pi 
where  (.)  means  %changes  from  the  previous  quarter. 
Thus,  country's  ; 
formula  below: 
related central  rate  <r;  ,IUA) 
·t  .:.t 
r; ,IUA  =  P.  or 
1 
.  . 
.t  ""t  c::;  "'t 
r 1 .,IUA  =  P.  -~ W  .P  .  1  n-1  n-,  n-1 
changes,  will  follow  the 
In  a  world  with$,  ECU  and  Yen,  the  related central  rates  will  follow  t~e 
following  crawling central  rate  system: 
~  .  :t J  .. t  -t  -t 
r $,IUA  =  p$  - 0,53PECU  +  0,12PYen 
. t  :.t  [  .  t  't  J 
r ECU,IUA  =  PECU  - 0,3SP$  + 0,12Pven 
r 
:.t  - [o,s3~~cu + o,3s~$]  =  PYen  Yen,IUA 
- 55  -Also,  the bilateral central  rates will  change  as  follows: 
.t  !.t  !.t  G  ~t  ~t  J  rECU,$  =  PECU  - p$  0,35P$  - 0,53PECU 
.t  .:.t  .:.t  G  ~t  :t J  r  =  PECU  - p  - 0,12PYen  - 0,53PEOU  ECU,Yen  Yen 
.t  .&t  .:.t  G  ~t  ~t J  r  =  p$  - p  - 0,12PYen  - 0,35P$  $,Yen  Yen 
- 56  -Technical  Annex 
Estimation of  Economic  Weights  based  on  the  average  of  1979-1983 
Currency  Issuing  country's export  Official  holding  Total 
$ 
Ecu10 
yen 
of goods  and  services 
In bill.  SQR 
177,710 
506,296 
114,156 
of  currency 
167,41 
42,97 
8,89 
We  assume  that  in  December  1983,  1  IUA  = 1  SDR 
345,12 
549,24 
123,05 
1.017,41 
Econ.Weights 
33,92% 
53,99% 
12,09% 
Since  in  December  1983,  1  SDR  = 1,29904  ECU  and  since during  the  IV  quarter of 
1983,  the  average  value of  1  unit  of  ECU  is: 
1  ECU  =  0,840  $ 
0,802  SDR 
196,300  yen 
then,  the  average  exchange  rates of  ECU  per  unit  of  currency 
1  $  = 1,1905  ECU 
1  yen  =  0,00509  ECU 
1  SDR  = 1,2469  ECU 
- 57  -
is: Estimation of the  currency  amounts  in the  IUA 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
------ ------- ------ -------- ---------
$  33,92  1,1905  0,37013  1,2438  0,460367  0,362728 
ECU  53,99  1  0,70135  1  0,701350  0,687324 
Yen  12,09  0,00509  30,85539  0,00531  0,163842  30,238305 
11.325559 
1  Currency 
2  Economic  Weights  in X 
3  Average  Rates  of  ECU,  per unit of  currency  CIV  quarter 1983) 
4·  Preliminary  Currency  Amounts  (Column  2  X 1,29904)/Column  3 
5  Exchange  Rates  in January  1984.  ECU  per unit of  currency 
6  Preliminary  Currency  Amounts  (Column  4  X Column  5) 
7  Precise  Currency  Amounts  Column  4  X 1,29904 
1,32559 
8  Rounded  Currency  Amounts 
The  estimation of  the currency  weights  of  an  IUA  and  its value 
participating currency - 16  July 1984  -
1  2  3  4  5  6 
------- ------- ----------
$  0,362 
ECU  0,687 
Yen  30,238 
1  Currency 
2  Amounts 
0,786  0,46056 
1  0,68700 
190,7  0,15856 
1.1.30612  ECU 
3  16  July 1984,  ECU  exchange  rates 
0,35 
0,53 
0,12 
4  ECU  value  of  Currency  Amounts  (Column  2/Column  3) 
5  Currency  weights  (Column  4/1.30612) 
1,02661 
1,30612 
249,07708 
in 
8 
-------
0.362 
0.687 
30.238 
each 
6  16  July 1984  :  Value  of  IUA  in each  currency  (Column  3  X 1.306112) 
Sources:  1)  European  Economy,  Supplement  A 
2)  H.  Joly  Dixon;  (1977>,  The  European  Unit  of  Account 
Journal  of  Common  Market  Studies 
- 58  -Notes 
- 59  -1.  EC  Commission,  "General  Report  for  1986",  p.  326-7  and  Europe  Documents  No 
1401/1402  of  18  April  1986. 
2.  EC  Commission,  "Community-Japan  Relations",  Press  Release,  June  1987. 
3.  In  these models,  short-run exchange  rate  fluctuations  result  from  the  fast 
equilibration of  supply  and  demand  in  the  foreign  exchange  markets. 
Because  current  exchan~e rates determined  in  an  efficient  financial  market 
already summarise  all  known  relevant  information,  it is primarily 
anticipated developments  in  a  wide  spectrum  of  macro-economic  and 
financial  variables  that  influence exchange  rates  in these  models.  Trade 
and  current  account  disequilibria  influence  the  exchange  rate  only  in  the 
long-run  and  usually are  not  taken  account  in  these  short  run  models.  See 
for  example  Jacob  A.  Frenkel,  Michael  C.  Mussa,  "Asset  Markets,  Exchange 
Rates  and  the  Balance  of  Payments"  in  R.  W.  Jones  and  P.B  Kenen  (eds.> 
Handbook  of  International  Economics,  Vol.  2,  North  Holland,  Amsterdam 
1985. 
4.  This  is  the  so-known  J-curve effect  that  postulates  a  "perverse" 
relationship between  the  current  account  and  the  exchange  rate.  Here,  an 
appreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  leads  to  surpluses  in  the  current 
account  and  a  depreciation to deficits.  This  is due  to the  current 
account  being  composed  by  the  capital  and  the  trade account.  Capital 
flows  react  fast  to  changes  in  the  exchange  rate,  trade  flows  much  slower. 
An  appreciation  <and  the  expectation of  an  appreciation)  leads  thus  to 
capital  inflow  and  this of  course  brings  about  a  surplus  in  the  capital 
account.  On  the other  hand,  the  same  appreciation  influences  the trade 
balance  slowly,  so  that  for  one  or  two  periods  the  trade  balance  does  not 
change  substantially.  The  combined  effect of  the  two  accounts  on  the 
current  account  is thus  positive  (surplus)  in the  case  of  an  exchange  rate 
appreciation  and  negative  (deficit)  for  the  same  reasons  in the  case  of  an 
exchange  rate depreciation. 
- 60  -5.  Eurostat,  "Statistical basic  data  of  the  EC",  24  edition,  p.  273  and  OECD 
Economic  Survey,  Japan  1986/87,  Table  17. 
6.  The  terms  of  trade  show  how  many  units of  foreign  goods  a  unit  of the 
domestic  product  can  buy.  Falling  terms  of  trade  imply  thus  that  a  unit 
of  domestic  product  buys  less  foreign  goods,  i.e.  the  relative value of 
the  foreign  goods  have  increased vis-a-vis the  domestic  good. 
7.  From  the  national  inco~e accounting  identity,  we  have: 
Sp  +  SNG  - IDP  = INF  = CA 
i.e. total of  private  savings  plus  government  net  savings  less domestic 
private  investment  equals  net  foreign  investment,  equals  the  current 
account  balance  (abstracting  from  official  intervention).  The  identity 
does  not  indicate a  direct  casualty between  the  various  elements,  but  it 
serves  to underline  the  fact  that  a  country  that  saves  more  than  it 
invests domestically must  have  ex  post  a  net  capital  outflow  and  a 
corresponding  current  account  surplus. 
8.  Information  included  in  the  preceding  sections  comes  from  various articles 
in  the  Financial  Times  Survey,  "Japanese  investment  in  Europe",  13 
November  1986. 
9.  Yves  Doz  (!nsead),  Gary  Hamel  (Loudox  Business  School),  C.K.  Prahalad 
(University of  Michigan>,  as  reported  in  the  Financial  Times  of  17  October 
1986. 
10.  Part  of  a  bond  issue which  entitles the  bearer to subscribe  to  new  shares 
or  bonds  at  special  conditions. 
- 61  -11.  Maekawa  is  a  former  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  Japan. 
12.  According  to  the  Marshall-Lerner  condition,  an  appreciation of  a  currency 
has  a  negative effect  on  the  current  account  if  <assuming  equality of 
imports  and  exports  before  the  appreciation)  the  sum  of  the  price 
elasticities of  imports  and  imports  (in absolute  numbers)  is greater than 
one,  i.e. 
I  E  I  +  I  N  I~  1 
Since,  in  the  case  of  Japan  exports  are  1.5 time  imports,  the  M-L 
condition  becomes 
1.5  I  E I+ 1.0  IN/~  1 
According  to  estimates of  the  Bank  of  Japan  <1986)  the  export  elasticity 
is 0.8 and  the  import  elasticity 0.3  so  that: 
1.5  •  0.8  + 1  0.3 = 1.5>  1 
This  means  that  an  appreciation of  the  yen's  exchange  rate will  reduce  the 
current  account  <Williamson,  1983). 
13.  Point  5  and  7  of  the  Venice  Summit  final  declaration. 
14.  During  an  opinion  poll  in  September  1986,  in  KKC  Letter  No  37. 
15.  Characteristic  for  such  criticisms  is  the  following  statement  by  the  US 
Assistant  Secretary of  the  Treasury  for  International  Affairs,  David 
Mulford:  "Deregulation  also entails the  ability of  foreign  firms  to 
introduce  innovative  products  and  services  in  which  they  have  a 
competitive  adva~tage into the  Japanese  market.  The  time  is past  when  we 
can  accept  protection  of  Japan's  financial  firms  from  the  winds  of 
competitive  innovations  by  foreign  firms.  If a  new  product  or  service  is 
designed  outside  of  Japan  by  a  US  firm,  the  firm  should  be  aple  to offer 
it promptly  to  its  Japanese  clients without  the  Long  delays  and  refusals 
which  characterise  the  present  situation".  Reprinted  in  US  Mission  to  the 
EC,  USA-Text,  Mo  15  of  29.5.87. 
- 62  -16.  Points  10  and  11  of  the declaration. 
17.  For  a  more  complete  presentation of  such  a  proposal  see 
Kyriazis-Chryssanthou  (1986>  and  the  Annex. 
18.  Policy  making  has  game  aspects  since  in an  interdependent  world,  policy 
makers  in one  country must  condition their actions  according  to the 
policies  pursued  in other  countries  if their policy making  is  rational. 
It is a  well-known  result of  such  policy games  that  in the absence  of 
direct  cooperation or  side-payments  the outcome  of  such  games  are  socially 
inefficient.  There  exist alternative policies that  would,  if implemented, 
benefit  all parties.  The  reason  why  such  outcomes  are not  automatically 
forthcoming  is that  policy makers  generaly  have  an  incentive to cheat  in 
these  Pareto optimal  outcomes,  and  politically sovereign  policy makers 
seem  to  have  difficulty achieving  them.  But  this means  that if 
coordination  is achieved  and  if a  way  to  control  this  is  found,  e.g. 
through  a  system  of objective  indicators,  so  as  to avoid  cheating,  then 
the outcome  of  coordination  is better than  the  outcome  of  non-coordination 
in  the  sense  of  increasing welfare  for  all parties  concerned. 
19.  Roland  Vaubel,  "Logische  Implikationen  und  Anreizwirkungen  des  EWS"  in 
Zeitschrit  fur  Wirtschafts  und  Sozialisissenschaften 1981/1. 
20.  Trevor  Underwood,  "Analysis  of  Proposals  for  Using  Objective  Indicators as 
a  Guide  to  Exchange  Rate  Changes",  IMF  Staff Papers  1973. 
21.  OPTICA  Report  1976:  Inflation and  Exchange  Rates:  Evidence  and  Policy 
Guidelines  for  the  European  Community.  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities,  Brussels,  10  February  1977. 
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